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More Prices, More Problems: Challenging Indication-
Specific Pricing as a Solution to Prescription Drug
Spending in the United States
Ryan Knox*
ABSTRACT
In the United States, high prices of prescription drugs and rapidly increasing
prescription drug spending have caused public outrage and calls for action. There
is bipartisan acknowledgement of the problem by lawmakers, but no agreement on
how to fix it. Value-based pricing models have gained increasing support and have
been suggested as one possible solution to controlling prescription drug spending.
One proposed value-based pricing model is indication-specific pricing: linking the
price of a multi-indication prescription drug with the indication for which it is
prescribed to a patient. Indication-specific pricing is intended to incentivize using
higher-value treatments and allocating prescription drugs to patients who will
receive the greatest benefit. However, there are many barriers to implementing
indication-specific pricing in federal health insurance programs in the United
States. Further, as a policy matter, indication-specific pricing would likely not
decrease overall prescription drug spending and could worsen the accessibility and
affordability of prescription drugs. This Note argues that lawmakers should not
pursue an indication-specific pricing regime as a means to decrease prescription
drug spending. Instead, lawmakers seeking prescription drug reform should
consider methods that will more likely decrease prescription drug prices and
spending while also ensuring patients' access to medicines.
* J.D., 2019, New York University School of Law; B.S. Health Science, 2016, Boston University. I
would like to thank Sylvia Law and Rachel Sachs for their thoughtful comments and support
throughout the writing of this Note. Thank you also to the editors at the Yale Journal of Health Policy,
Law, and Ethics, especially Mason Marks, for their helpful feedback and excellent revisions.
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INTRODUCTION
The high cost of prescription drugs is a matter of serious concern in the United
States. Several drug pricing scandals have elicited public outrage.' Gilead Sciences
priced a twelve-week course of treatment for its first two hepatitis C treatments,
Sovaldi and Harvoni, at $84,000 and $94,500 respectively.2  Turing
Pharmaceuticals raised the price of Daraprim, a treatment for toxoplasmosis, by
5,000 percent, from $13.50 to $750 per pill, immediately after acquiring rights to
the drug.3 Many new cancer drugs have been released and priced at hundreds of
thousands of dollars per year.4 Amgen's cancer drug Blincyto was approved in
2014 at a price of $178,0005 and Novartis' cancer treatment Kymriah was
approved in 2017 at a price of $475,000.6 The average cancer drug now costs four
times the average household income.7 Unaffordable prescription drugs can lead to
patient non-adherence, worsening health outcomes and increasing use and cost of
1. See, e.g., Peter J. Neumann & Joshua T. Cohen, Measuring the Value of Prescription
Drugs, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2595, 2595 (2015) ("Escalating drug prices have alarmed physicians
and the American public and led to calls for government price controls."); Charles Ornstein & Katie
Thomas, Prescription Drugs May Cost More With Insurance Than Without It, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 9,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/health/drug-prices-generics-insurance.html
(describing the current time period as "an era when drug prices have ignited public outrage and
insurers are requiring consumers to shoulder more of the costs"); Andrew Pollack, High Cost of
Sovaldi Hepatitis C Drug Prompts a Call to Void Its Patents, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/business/high-cost-of-hepatitis-c-drug-prompts-a-call-to-
void-its-patents.html_(on Sovaldi scandal) [hereinafter Pollack, High Cost]; Andrew Pollack, Drug
Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TImEs (Sept. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/2 1/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-
protests.html (on Daraprim scandal) [hereinafter Pollack, $750 Overnight].
2. See; Carolyn Y. Johnson & Brady Dennis, How an $84,000 drug got its price: 'Let's hold
our position ... whatever the headlines', WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/0 I/how-an-84000-drug-got-its-price-
lets-hold-our-position-whatever-the-headlines/?utm term=.68eea7c 17de8.
3. See Pollack, $750 Overnight, supra note 1.
4. See SUSAN DENTZER & TOM HUBBARD, VALUE-BASED CONTRACTING FOR ONCOLOGY
DRUGS: ANEHI WHITE PAPER 10, 11 (2017) (discussing Keytruda, a $150,000 per year treatment for
metastatic melanoma, and Kymriah, a $475,000 personalized treatment for pediatric and adult
patients with a type of acute lymphoblastic leukemia); Emily K. White, Killing U.S. Slowly: Curing
the Epidemic Rise of Cancer Drug Prices, 72 FOOD AND DRUG L. J. 189, 191 (2017) ("Over the past
fifteen years, the average price of a cancer drug has increased ten to fifteen times, costing patients
over $100,000 a year in 2012.").
5. See White, supra note 4, at 191.
6. See Denise Grady, F.D.A. Approves First Gene-Altering Leukemia Treatment, Costing
$475,000, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/health/gene-therapy-
cancer.html.
7. Julia Belluz, The Nobel Prize is a reminder of the outrageous cost of curing cancer, Vox
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/10/1/17923720/immunotherapy-
cancer-cost.
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other health services.
The problem of high prescription drug prices goes far beyond these few
surprising examples. On average the United States spends twice as much as other
countries on prescription drugs.9 Prescription drug spending accounted for
approximately 17 percent of all healthcare spending in 2015 and is the fastest
growing portion of the healthcare budget. 10 Total prescription drug spending in the
United States rose 12 percent in 2015 and another 6 percent in 2016, reaching $450
billion.11 These high and increasing prices are a result of several factors, including
the higher prices paid for prescription drugs under patent compared to generics,
weaker negotiating power of federal government payers, and rapid adoption of
newly released prescription drugs in the United States.'
2
When polled in 2015, the public expressed that its top health policy priority
8. See White, supra note 4, at 190 (explaining the strategic choices of the pharmaceutical
industry "have also left many Americans unable to afford their medications; particularly patients who
are elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged, or suffer from chronic diseases."); Steven G. Morgan
& Augustine Lee, Cost-related non-adherence to prescribed medicines among older adults: a cross-
sectional analysis of a survey in 11 developed countries, BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2017); Peter B. Bach &
Steven D. Pearson, Payer and Policy Maker Steps to Support Value-Based Pricing for Drugs, 314 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 2503, 2503 (2015); Aurel 0. Iuga & Maura J. McGuire, Adherence and health care
costs, 7 RISK MGMT. AND HEALTHCARE POL'Y 35, 37 (2014) ("Between $100 and $300 billion of
avoidable health care costs have been attributed to nonadherence in the US annually, representing
3% to 10% of total US health care costs.").
9. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Prescription Drug Costs Are Rising as a Campaign Issue, THE
UPSHOT (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/upshot/prescription-drug-costs-are-
rising-as-a-campaign-issue.html. See also DAVID 0. SARNAK ET AL., PAYING FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS AROUND THE WORLD: WHY IS THE U.S. AN OUTLIER? 2 (2017). Interestingly, this is not the
case for generic drugs, which are cheaper in the United States. See Tal Gross & Miriam J. Laugesen,
The Price of Health Care: Is the United States an Outlier?, 42 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & L. 771,
774 (2018). Humira, which costs on average $2,669 for a 28-day supply in the United States, costs
just $1,362 in the United Kingdom and $822 in Switzerland. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
PAYMENT POLICIES TO MANAGE PHARMACEUTICAL COSTS: INSIGHTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 9 (Mar.
2017). Similarly, Harvoni, which costs on average $32,114 for a 28-day supply, costs $22,554 in the
United Kingdom and $16,861 in Switzerland. Id.
10. AARON BERMAN ET AL., CURBING UNFAIR DRUG PRICES: A PRIMER FOR STATES 4 (Aug.
2017). In 2014, after a period of relatively stable drug spending, prescription drug spending in the
United States increased by 12 percent when adjusted for inflation. See Sanger-Katz, supra note 10.
11. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Health Law Year in P/Review: Prescription Drug Prices (Dec. 12,
2017), https://vimeo.com/247814795#t-27m14s.
12. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 9, at 9-10; Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High
Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 858, 860 (2016) ("Drug prices are higher in the United States than in the rest of the
industrialized world because, unlike that in nearly every other advanced nation, the US health care
system allows manufacturers to set their own price for a given product."). New prescription drugs
often enter the market at extremely high prices: the average price of a new drug or biologic in 2016
was over $17,000 per month. See ExPREss SCRIPTS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING: A PUBLIC POLICY
ANALYSIS 5 (Feb. 2017).
18:2 (2019)
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was making prescription drugs more affordable. 13 Since then, politicians from both
sides of the aisle have called for prescription drug pricing reform. 14 President
Trump has asserted that he and Secretary of Health and Human Services Azar will
decrease the price of prescription drugs. 5 Since then, the Trump Administration
has made various proposals to combat high prescription drug prices. In his first
proposal, President Trump focused on the high list prices, the lack of negotiating
tools, high out-of-pocket costs, and the lower prices for drugs in other countries. 16
Another proposal suggested decreasing prescription drug prices and spending
under Medicare Part B by changing the way physicians pay for and are reimbursed
for drugs. 1
7
The federal government has shown interest in exploring value-based payment
13. Erin Trish et al., Medicare Beneficiaries Face Growing Out-Of-Pocket Burden For
Specialty Drugs While In Catastrophic Coverage Phase, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1564, 1564 (2016) ("the
public's top health policy priority for the president and Congress is 'making sure that high-cost drugs
are affordable to those who need them."' (quoting Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: October 2015,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-
tracking-poll-october-2015/). See also Karen Van Nuys et al., Reining in pharmaceutical costs,
BROOKINGS (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/08/03/reining-in-
pharmaceutical-costs/ ("Most Americans believe that President Trump and the Congress should make
lowering the cost of prescription drugs a priority."); THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
REFORMING BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AT HOME AND ABROAD 1 (Feb. 2018).
14. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, The Fight Trump Faces Over Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/health/the-fight-trump-faces-over-drug-prices.html
("During the campaign, Mr. Trump joined his Democratic opponents, Mr. Sanders and Hillary
Clinton, in calling for the federal government to be allowed to negotiate the price of drugs."); Rachel
Sachs et al., Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid's Best-Price Rule, 42 J.
HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & L. 5, 5 (2017) ("Even in today's polarized political landscape, a consensus
has emerged: Americans deserve better value for their health care dollars. The focus on value sits
well with liberals and conservatives, health insurers and pharmaceutical manufacturers, and a host of
disparate stakeholder groups.").
15. Ike Swelitz, Trump says new health secretary will 'get those prescription prices way
down,' STAT (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/01/29/trump-azar-drug-prices/; Katie
Thomas & Reed Abelson, Lower Drug Prices: New Proposals Carry Lots of Promises, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/health/trump-drug-prices-medicare.html.
Former Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Scott Gottlieb has also expressed concern over
high prescription drug prices and has been clearer with proposed policy solutions, including faster
regulatory approvals and promoting increased generic drug market entry. See Sarah Jane Tribble &
Liz Szabo, FDA vows to combat high drug prices and companies 'gaming the system,' CNN MONEY
(Feb. 16, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/16/news/economy/fda-drug-prices/index.html;
Nathaniel Weixel, FDA chief becomes point man on drug prices, THE HILL (Mar. 14, 2018),
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbyingibusiness-a-lobbying/378254-fda-chief-becomes-point-man-
on-drug-prices.
16. See generally U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AMERICAN PATIENTS FIRST: THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT TO LOWER DRUG PRICES AND REDUCE OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS
(2018) (hereinafter AMERICAN PATIENTS FIRST) (outlining President Trump's drug pricing priorities).
17. See Rachel Sachs, Administration Outlines Plan To Lower Pharmaceutical Prices In
Medicare Part B, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/l 0.1377/hblog2Ol81026.360332/full/.
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models to reform prescription drug pricing. The Department of Health and Human
Services suggested value-based pricing, including indication-specific pricing, as
possible opportunities to decrease high prescription drug prices. With a growing
number of prescription drugs indicated for the treatment of several different
conditions, especially in oncology, 18 indication-specific pricing, one type of value-
based pricing model, has received increased attention as a potential solution to high
prescription drug prices. 19
Indication-specific pricing, sometimes called indication-based pricing, is a
value-based payment scheme where a prescription drug used to treat multiple
conditions is priced based on the condition for which it is prescribed .20 Indication-
specific pricing sets higher prices for higher-value indications, and lower prices
for lower-value indications.21 This scheme intends for prescription drug prices to
better reflect value received by an individual patient. Despite its intent, an
indication-specific pricing model may not actually accomplish the overarching
policy goal of decreasing prescription drug spending and prices.23 Further, there
are several significant legal, regulatory, and policy barriers to implementing
indication-specific pricing in the United States healthcare system.24 This Note,
therefore, will argue that lawmakers should not pursue an indication-specific
pricing regime and should instead consider other methods to control prescription
18. See Peter B. Bach, Indication-Specific Pricing for Cancer Drugs, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
1629, 1629 (2014). See generally STEPHEN D. PEARSON ET AL., INDICATION-SPECIFIC PRICING OF
PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: A REPORT FROM THE 2015 ICER
MEMBERSHIP POLICY SUMMIT (Mar. 2016) (analyzing the potential for implementing an indication-
specific pricing regime in the United States).
19. See also Tara O'Neill Hayes, Current Impediments to Value-Based Pricing for
Prescription Drugs, AM. ACTION F. (June 12, 2017),
https://www. americanactionforum.org/research/current-impediments-value-based-pricing-
prescription-drugs/ ("With the unprecedented number of specialty medicines and oncology
treatments expected over the next few years, the cost of prescription drugs will continue to be a
concern for all stakeholders. QuintileslMS Institute finds that 28 percent of new drugs currently being
developed are oncology medicines, and nearly half of all drug spending in the U.S. will be for
specialty medicines by 2021 .").
20. See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 2 (defining indication-specific pricing as "setting
different prices for different indications or for distinct patient subpopulations eligible for treatment
with a medication.").
21. See Amitabh Chandra & Craig Garthwaite, The Economics of Indication-Based Drug
Pricing, 377 NEw ENG. J. MED. 103, 103-04 (2017).
22. See id.
23. See id. ("relative to uniform pricing, indication-[specific] pricing results in higher prices
for patients who benefit the most, higher utilization by patients who benefit least, higher overall
spending, and higher manufacturer profits"). See also Part III, infra.
24. See generally PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18 (analyzing the potential for implementing an
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drug prices and spending.25
Part I provides background on value-based pricing models and defines
indication-specific pricing of prescription drugs. Part II identifies and describes the
legal and regulatory barriers to indication-specific pricing under Medicare,
Medicaid, the 340B Drug Discount Program, and the Veterans Health
Administration program. Part III presents the policy incentives raised by
indication-specific pricing of prescription drugs in federal health insurance
programs and discusses how it would impact the FDA regulatory system, off-label
prescribing and promotion, and prescription drug prices. Ultimately, Part III argues
that lawmakers should explore other methods, instead of indication-specific
pricing, to decrease prescription drug prices and spending. Part IV suggests
alternatives to indication-specific pricing that could be considered, introduces
some initiatives that have already been raised, and recommends next steps for
lawmakers.
I. VALUE-BASED PRICING MODELS AND INDICATION-SPECIFIC PRICING
A. Value-Based Pricing of Prescription Drugs
Currently in the United States, prescription drugs are generally reimbursed in
a fee-for-service model.16 Insurance companies reimburse per unit of the
prescription drug without regard to outcome, indication, value to the patient, or
any other factors. Critics of this payment model stress that not all patients receive
the same benefit or value from a prescription drug even though they pay the same
amount as patients who do benefit.27 To avoid paying for ineffective treatments
and to lower prescription drug prices, some advocates propose value-based pricing
models.
Value-based pricing models link the price paid for a prescription drug with
the expected or actual benefit to the patient.28 There are several different types of
25. As the majority of prescription drugs for which indication-specific pricing is being
proposed are high-priced brand name drugs with no generic alternative, typically for cancer treatment
or other rare diseases, see generally Bach, supra note 18 (discussing indication-specific pricing for
cancer drugs), this Note will focus only on the issues presented by indication-specific pricing of
brand-name prescription drugs.
26. See Gregory Daniel et al., Advancing Gene Therapies and Curative Health Care Through
Value-Based Payment Reform, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/1 0.1377/hblog20171027.83602/full/. This is sometimes referred to
as a "price-per-dose basis." See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 5.
27. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 6 ("[M]any patients receive little or no benefit from their
prescription drugs-yet they pay precisely the same amount as those who do benefit.").
28. See Daniel et al., supra note 26 ("[Value-based payment models] are designed to link
payment more explicitly to a treatment's value, expected or realized."). See generally Sachs et al.,
supra note 14, at 7-14 (discussing how different value-based payment models work for prescription
drugs).
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value-based pricing models, differentiated based on the types of value measured
(considering various contexts, benchmarks, or outcomes) in the model.2 9 Value-
based pricing models apply the determination of value to ultimately calculate the
value-based price. The overall goal of value-based pricing is to incentivize
providers to choose higher value, more effective prescription drugs, resulting in
better outcomes for patients and lower overall healthcare spending. 30 Value-based
pricing models therefore also encourage manufacturers to develop more effective
and more profitable prescription drugs.
While the general concept of value-based pricing is simple, determining the
value-based price of a prescription drug is exceedingly challenging. Most difficult
is deciding what constitutes value and what factors represent this definition of
value.31 Value is typically considered to be "the benefit of a treatment with respect
to its cost,"' 3 2 but various factors must be taken into account in calculating the
magnitude of this benefit with respect to cost. The determination of value can be
made with respect to an individual patient (did this specific patient receive the
intended benefit from this prescription drug?), to a sub-population (did the sub-
population with a specific characteristic receive the intended benefit?),33 or to a
population as a whole (did this prescription drug lower the overall mortality or
improve a health outcome to a predetermined benchmark related to clinical trial
demonstrations?). 4 The value could be based on clinical measures, for example, a
final treatment outcome, achieving a benchmark outcome in the course of
treatment, or the disease requiring treatment.35 This value could also be more
subjective and include patient-centered benchmarks, such as patient satisfaction,
increased quality of life, or decreased pain.
29. This Note focuses on indication-specific pricing, discussed in detail in Part I.B, infra. Other
types of value-based payment models include outcome-based payment, drug licenses, and drug
mortgages. For a detailed description of these value-based payment models, see Sachs et al., supra
note 14, at 10-14.
30. See Daniel et al., supra note 26.
31. See id. at 2595-97 ("Value is an elusive target, and there's no consensus about what
dimensions should be taken into account."). Several organizations have developed their own
methodologies of evaluating prescription drugs and calculating their value to patients. See id. For
example, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center's framework focuses on the cancer drug's mode
of action, efficacy, and toxicity. Id. By contrast, the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review's
framework primarily looks at a prescription drug's cost effectiveness in terms of cost per quality-
adjusted life year and overall budget impact, but also looks at clinical effectiveness and other benefits
in context. Id.
32. Bach, supra note 18, at 1629.
33. See id. ("What is the right price for any particular level of benefit? How should benefit be
determined? What if the condition is rare? What if the average benefit is small but a subgroup of
patients derives a large benefit?").
34. See Hayes, supra note 19 (describing value-based payment agreements where the
benchmarks were based on the results observed in clinical trials).
35. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 10-14 (discussing types of value-based pricing models).
18:2 (2019)
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B. Indication-Specific Pricing of Prescription Drugs
Prescription drugs are often used to treat more than one disease state or
indication.36 For example, Keytruda treats two different types of cancers and
Avastin treats both cancer and macular degeneration.37 However, despite the
varied effectiveness of individual prescription drugs for different indications,
prescription drug companies must charge the same price for the prescription drug
regardless of the indication for which it is prescribed to a patient.
Indication-specific pricing would change this scheme by linking the price of
the prescription drug to the condition for which it was prescribed.38 In indication-
specific pricing models, prescription drug manufacturers are paid more when their
prescription drug is used to treat an indication for which the product is more
effective or has a higher value (high-value indications) than when it is used to treat
an indication for which the product is less effective or has a lesser value for the
patient (low-value indications).39 For example, in an indication-specific pricing
regime, Keytruda would cost a different price when it is prescribed for the
treatment of advanced non-small cell lung cancer than it is for advanced
melanoma, based on its effectiveness in treating the condition.40  The
determinations of value or effectiveness are typically based on the data collected
during clinical trials.41 Depending on an individual's prescription drug coverage,
these higher prices for high-value indications are likely less affordable and less
accessible as a result.42 Conversely, indication-specific pricing sets lower prices
for lower-value indications, resulting in them being more affordable, more
accessible, and used more by patient populations who receive a comparatively
lesser benefit from them.43 Indication-specific pricing models can be a pure
indication-specific pricing regime, meaning that each different indication has a
different price, or a partially indication-specific pricing regime, generally meaning
36. See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 6 ("A multi-indication medication is a drug that is
approved or prescribed for more than one condition or for a single condition with multiple identifiable
patient sub-groups that have important differences in baseline risk and/or treatment outcomes.");
Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103 ("in oncology, for instance, response to a treatment
varies with the type of tumor and stage of disease.").
37. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 7-8.
38. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 7-8; Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103;
PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 2 (defining indication-specific pricing as "setting different prices
for different indications or for distinct patient subpopulations eligible for treatment with a
medication.").
39. See Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103.
40. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 7-8; KEYTRUDA ® (pembrolizumab), KEYTRUDA.COM
(Nov. 2017), https://www.keytruda.com (listing the FDA-approved indications of Keytruda)
41. Hayes, supra note 19.
42. See Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103-04.
43. See id.
9
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that indication-specific prices are combined into a weighted-average price.
44
Some countries have implemented indication-specific pricing regimes for
prescription drugs, either in part or in a pure form.45 Italy has adopted a pure
indication-specific pricing regime for some prescription drugs, including some
cancer drugs and an anti-inflammatory prescription drug, through the use of
managed entry agreements.46 Managed entry agreements are contracts between
payers and a pharmaceutical company that allows a prescription drug to be covered
subject to certain conditions.47 Italy permits three types of managed entry
agreements, each involving some sort of refund to the payer for insufficient
outcomes. 48 Some of these managed entry agreements consider different outcomes
(and thus different refunds) for different indications, resulting in a de facto
indication-specific price.4 9 Even with some indication-specific pricing and
outcomes-based pricing arrangements, Italy has not seen any resulting decrease in
the cost of prescription drugs.50 Other countries have incorporated the value of
each indication of a drug into their prescription drug prices, resulting in a partially
indication-specific pricing regime. Australia has used weighted-average prices for
prescription drugs with multiple indications, combining the different value-based
prices for each indication into a single weighted average price.5' The United
Kingdom allows prescription drugs to increase their reimbursement price once if a
prescription drug manufacturer identifies a new high-value indication. 52
In theory, indication-specific pricing may help better allocate prescription
drugs, incentivizing prescribing high-value indications instead of less effective
treatments and incentivizing prescription drug manufacturers to develop more
effective treatments and support their products with demonstrations of
effectiveness.53 However, indication-specific pricing would face several legal
barriers to implementation in federal health insurance programs in the United
44. See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 11-12 (describing different variations of indication-
specific pricing models).
45. See id. at 12.
46. See id. at 13; Mathias Flume, et al., Feasibility and Attractiveness of Indication Value-
based Pricing in Key EU Countries, 4 J. MARKET ACCESS & HEALTH POL'Y (2016).
47. Jacoline C. Bouvy et al., Managed Entry Agreements for Pharmaceuticals in the Context
of Adaptive Pathways in Europe, 9 FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY 280, 280 (2018).
48. See Flume, et al., supra note 46.
49. See id.
50. See Noemie Bisserbe, For New Trump Drug Plan, a Cautionary Tale in Italy, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/italy-serves-cautionary-lesson-for-new-trump-drug-
plan-1523959644 (discussing the results of outcomes-based contracts).
51. See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 13 (describing different variations of indication-
specific pricing models).
52. See id.
53. See generally Susan Abedi, Indication-Based Pricing- The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly,
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States.54 Additionally, the policy effects of indication-specific pricing are
debated. " There are several reasons advocates support indication-specific pricing,
including having prescription drug prices better reflect their value to patients and
incentivizing manufacturers to develop high-value treatments. Supporters of
indication-specific pricing assert that this regime would decrease spending for
high-cost prescription drugs, while critics claim it will increase spending. 56
The remainder of this Note will detail the legal, regulatory, and policy barriers
to implementing an indication-specific pricing regime in the United States,
particularly in federal health insurance programs.57 Further, this Note will
demonstrate that although these barriers may not be insurmountable, indication-
specific pricing is not the appropriate solution to high prescription drug spending
and prices in the United States.
II. INDICATION-SPECIFIC PRICING IN FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Implementing an indication-specific pricing regime would require rethinking
the prescription drug pricing and reimbursement models of federal government
health insurance programs. The federal government pays for healthcare, including
prescription drugs, through several independent health insurance programs. Each
program has, among other things, different eligibility requirements, different
benefits packages, and different means of determining the price, provision, and
reimbursement of prescription drugs. These systems pose different barriers to
indication-specific pricing. This Part introduces four of the major federal health
insurance programs purchasing prescription drugs (Medicare, Medicaid, the 340B
Drug Discount Program, and the Veterans Health Administration); describes how
each program structures pricing, reimbursement, and payment for prescription
drugs; and discusses the barriers to implement an indication-specific pricing
54. See Part II, infra. See also Bach, supra note 18, at 1630.
55. Compare Bach, supra note 18, with Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21.
56. See Part III, infra. See also Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103 ("Supporters hope
that such a system will re-duce prices for low-value indications but that prices for high-value
indications will not increase." (citing Bach, supra note 18, at 1629-30)); Chandra & Garthwaite,
supra note 21, at 103-04 (arguing that indication-specific pricing would increase overall drug
spending); PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 8-10 (listing the risks and benefits of indication-specific
pricing of prescription drugs to payers and prescription drug manufacturers).
57. In considering indication-specific pricing as a solution to high prescription drug prices and
spending, this Note assumes that if an indication-specific pricing model were allowed or adopted, all
prescription drugs purchased in the United States by federal health insurance programs would now
be subject to an indication-specific price. Further, this indication-specific price would reflect the
value of the treatment to a patient population relative to other treatments. While this is ideally the
case, adopting this policy does not guarantee that the negotiated price would in fact accurately reflect
the actual value of a treatment received by a patient. This may affect the degree of the impact and
incentive effects of indication-specific pricing. Regardless, the legal and regulatory barriers to
indication-specific pricing and the policy incentives identified remain significant.
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regime for prescription drugs in each program.
A. Medicare
Medicare provides health insurance coverage for people age sixty-five and
over, some younger people with disabilities, and people with end-stage renal
disease.5 8 Medicare currently provides health insurance for approximately fifty-
five million people in the United States,59 covering $672.1 billion in healthcare
services in 2016.60 Medicare alone comprises approximately 40 percent of the
pharmaceutical market in the United States.
61
The Medicare program covers different healthcare services under different
parts of the program.62 Medicare Part A, sometimes referred to as Hospital
Insurance, covers healthcare during certain inpatient stays.63 Prescription drugs
used during a hospital stay are included in the broader reimbursement for the
inpatient stay.64 Medicare Part B primarily covers services provided in a doctor's
office.65 Prescription drugs administered during a physician office visit or in a
hospital outpatient clinic are included under Medicare Part B.66 Medicare Part C,
also called Medicare Advantage Plans, provides coverage for Medicare Part A and
Medicare Part B benefits, and often prescription drug coverage, through a private
company contracting with Medicare.67 Medicare Part D provides prescription drug
58. See What's Medicare, MEDICARE.GOV: THE OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SITE FOR
MEDICARE, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-
medicare/what-is-medicare.html; Health Policy Brief: Medicare Part D, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 10,
2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000172/full/healthpolicybrief 172.pdf
[hereinafter Medicare Part D Brief].
59. See Health Policy Brief: Implementing MACRA, HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20170327.272560/full/ (55 million people on
Medicare) [hereinafter MACRA Brie]. See also The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit,
KAISER FAM. FOUND, (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/the-medicare-
prescription-drug-benefit-fact-sheet/ (59 million people on Medicare).
60. NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html.
61. See Greg D'Angelo, The VA Drug Pricing Model: What Senators Should Know, HERITAGE
FOUND.: WEBMEMO (Apr. 11, 2007).
62. See What's Medicare, supra note 58.
63. See id. (explaining Medicare Part A "covers inpatient hospital stays, care in a skilled
nursing facility, hospice care, and some home health care.").
64. See Health Policy Brief: Medicare Part B, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171008.000171/full/healthpolicybrief 171 .pdf
[hereinafter Medicare Part B Brie].
65. See What's Medicare, supra note 58 (explaining Medicare Part B covers "certain doctors'
services, outpatient care, medical supplies, and preventive services.").
66. See Medicare Part B Brief, supra note 64; Medicare Part D Brief supra note 58.
67. See What's Medicare, supra note 58.
18:2 (2019)
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coverage through contracts with private companies and Medicare Advantage
Plans.68 Each part of Medicare calculates prescription drug prices and
reimbursement rates differently, posing various challenges to indication-specific
pricing. As the majority of prescription drug spending through Medicare occurs
under Parts B and D,69 the following sections further detail their prescription drug
pricing schemes.
1. Medicare Part B
Medicare Part B covers prescription drugs prescribed and administered in
outpatient clinics and physician's offices.70 These include prescription drugs
administered by injection or intravenously in a physician's office or hospital
outpatient setting and some oral cancer drugs that also have intravenous forms.
7'
Medicare Part B must cover all prescription drugs that are "reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury;" price cannot be taken
into account while deciding reimbursement coverage. Medicare Part B spending
on prescription drugs totaled approximately $25 billion in 2015, at least half of
which was spent on cancer drugs.73
Prescription drug manufacturers participating in Medicare Part B are required
to report prescription drug prices to the federal government on a per-unit basis
without a reported indication.74 Prescription drugs provided under Medicare Part
B are reimbursed at the average sales price to a non-federal government payer plus
6 percent paid as a handling fee to doctors.75 Patients are personally responsible
for paying a 20 percent co-insurance for all prescription drugs under Medicare Part
68. See id.
69. See Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2314 (2018).
70. See Medicare Part B Brief supra note 64; Medicare Part D Brief supra note 58.
71. White, supra note 4, at 194-95.
72. See Sachs, supra note 17 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A))).
73. Sachs, supra note 69, at 2314.
74. See Daniel et al., supra note 26. Manufacturers must report the average sales price and
average wholesale price of their products quarterly by the National Drug Code (NDC), and physicians
report the NDC and/or the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code for the
product administered, but the indication for which the prescription drug was eventually prescribed
by physicians is not reported. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, AVERAGE SALES PRICES: MANUFACTURER REPORTING AND CMS OVERSIGHT 3-4 (Feb.
2010); Report to the Congress: Medicare and the Health Care Delivery System (June 2016). See also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHCARE COMMON PROCEDURE CODING SYSTEM
(HCPCS) LEVEL II CODE MODIFICATION REQUEST PROCESS 2019 UPDATE (APR. 2017),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/MedHCPCSGenlnfo/Downloads/HCPCS-Application.pdf
(briefly advising on HCPCS coding through Medicare for prescription drugs).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a (dictating average sales price methodology); 42 C.F.R. §
414.804 (providing further regulations on average sales price methodology); Medicare Part B Brief
supra note 64.
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B with no upper limit on out-of-pocket spending.76
Medicare Part B poses a few significant challenges to adopting an indication-
specific pricing model. First, the price reporting requirements for prescription drug
manufacturers could cause a compliance issue; as indication-specific pricing by
definition is not a price-per-unit model, this regulation would have to be modified
in order for an indication-specific pricing model to be possible.77 The regulation
could be changed to require a price-per-unit-per-indication model, or otherwise
repealed or modified to allow indication-specific pricing. Further, because prices
are reported by product, not indications for the product,7 8 the current reporting
regime would need to be amended in order to include the indication for the reported
code. Second, there is no requirement for physicians to report the indication for
which they prescribe a prescription drug. In order for an indication-specific pricing
regime to be implemented, a law or regulation mandating physicians to report the
indication associated with each prescription would be necessary. Third, Medicare
Part B reimburses based on the average sales price not differentiated by
indication. 79 Average sales price would have to be redefined as average sales price
per indication, or the formula would have to be otherwise modified for an
indication-specific pricing regime to be implemented.
An indication-specific pricing scheme also would not address the questionable
policy incentives for physicians under Medicare Part B. The 6 percent handling fee
for physicians incentivizes physicians to prescribe prescription drugs with higher
costs. 80 The prescription drug with the higher price would theoretically be the most
effective treatment for the specific indication. This could effectively ensure that
physicians make rational choices and maximize the value of their prescribing.
However, with further incentives for doctors to prescribe the higher-priced
prescription drug, prescription drug spending may not decrease under an
indication-specific pricing model. In order to lessen the incentive for physicians,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed a demonstration
76. See id; Bach & Pearson, supra note 8, at 2503 ("the current policy of flat 20% co-insurance
without an upper limit has put some highly effective but expensive drugs out of reach for the roughly
6 million Medicare beneficiaries who have no supplemental insurance.").
77. See Daniel et al., supra note 26 ("Value-based payment arrangements by definition depart
from a per-unit price, but current statutory and regulatory provisions are not designed to capture such
arrangements. Manufacturers could be exposed to compliance risk when they seek to reflect a value-
based arrangement in their price reporting, and reflecting a value-based arrangement in a per-unit
metric could result in unintended reimbursement and payment consequences.").
78. See National Drug Code Directory, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/informationondrugs/ucml42438.htm. See also MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
SYSTEM 131 (June 2016) (listing multiple indications in relation to one HCPCS code).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a (dictating average sales price methodology not taking into
account indication); Medicare Part B Brief, supra note 64.
80. See Medicare Part B Brief, supra note 64.
18:2 (2019)
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project in 2016 (which was never implemented) that would have changed
physician reimbursement for prescription drugs under Medicare Part B to a flat
handling fee of $16.80 plus 2.5 percent of the average sales price.81 This proposal
was intended to maintain the same aggregate prescription drug spending under
Medicare Part B while increasing the handling fee for lower priced prescription
drugs.82 President Trump has also proposed a similar reform.83 While changing
this formula would address physician incentives to some extent, it would do little
to help beneficiaries afford prescription drugs. Reforms to prescription drug
pricing under Medicare Part B must consider this formula and the existing
reimbursement model so as not to exacerbate the existing incentives for physicians
to prescribe high priced prescription drugs and increase drug spending.
2. Medicare Part D
Medicare Part D is the largest federal program paying for prescription drugs.
84
Medicare Part D covers exclusively prescription drugs purchased at pharmacies by
consumers. 85 Medicare Part D plans are run by private companies contracting with
the federal government. 86 Medicare pays private companies running the Medicare
Part D plans a fixed grant to help pay for all prescription drugs used by covered
beneficiaries instead of paying for specific prescription drugs.87 Everyone on
Medicare has access to Medicare Part D and in 2017 over forty million people
enrolled in Medicare Part D plans.88 The largest Medicare Part D plans represent
approximately 21 percent of Medicare Part D recipients.89 Consumers eligible for
both Medicare and Medicaid receive their prescription drug coverage under
Medicare Part D.9' Total drug spending under Medicare Part D in 2015 was
81. See id. See also Deborah Schrag, Reimbursing Wisely? CMS's Trial of Medicare Part B
Payment Reform, 374 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2101, 2101 (2016).
82. See Medicare Part B Brief supra note 64.
83. See Sachs, supra note 17.
84. See Medicare Part D Brief, supra note 67.
85. See id.
86. Michael Adelberg & Marissa Schlaifer, The Other Side of Managed Competition: The
Tension Between Protection And Innovation In Medicare Advantage And Part D Benefits, HEALTH
AFF. BLOC (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171205.156064/fu11/
("Medicare Advantage and Medicare Part D are prime examples of managed competition markets,
where the government provides services by contracting with private entities to serve program
beneficiaries in a regulated market.").
87. See Medicare Part B Brief supra note 64.
88. See The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, supra note 59 (42 million people
enrolled on Medicare Part D plans).
89. See Medicare Part D Brief supra note 67.
90. See The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, supra note 59. This allocation of
Medicaid-eligible individuals to Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage raises its own
prescription drug spending problems, as on average "Medicare Part D pays ... 73% more than
15
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approximately $135 billion. 9
CMS requires all Medicare Part D plans to cover at least two prescription
drugs in each therapeutic class and all drugs in six classes, called protected classes,
which include antidepressants, antiretrovirals, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants,
immunosuppressants (to prevent organ transplant rejection), and antineoplastics (a
type of cancer treatment).92 There is still substantial variation between Medicare
Part D plans with regard to drugs included on the formularies and copayments (or
cost-sharing amounts for which patients are responsible at the point of service).93
The formularies of Medicare Part D plans generally tier drugs, differentiating
preferred prescription drugs (which are associated with lower copayments) from
more expensive non-preferred prescription drugs.94 Beneficiaries cover 25 percent
of prescription drug costs until the catastrophic cap of $4,950 in beneficiary
spending.95 After reaching the catastrophic cap, under a provision of the
Affordable Care Act to be implemented by 2020, beneficiaries are responsible for
5 percent of prescription drug costs, with the Medicare Part D plan covering 15
percent and a federal government reinsurance subsidy covering the remaining 80
percent. 
96
Medicare is prohibited by law from negotiating or setting prices for Medicare
Part D. 97 However, individual Medicare Part D plans can and do negotiate prices
Medicaid and 80% more than [the Veterans Health Administration] ... for the same brand-name
drugs." Micah Vitale, Note, The Rise in Prescription Drug Prices: The Conspiracy Against The Cure,
20 QuNIPIAc HEALTH L. J. 75, 92 (2017) (quoting MARc-ANDRt GAGNON & SIDNEY WOLFE,
MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: MEDICARE PART D PAYS NEEDLESSLY HIGH BRAND-NAME DRUG
PRICES COMPARED WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES AND WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 12
(2015), http://carleton.ca/sppa/wp-content/uploads/Mirror-Mirror- Medicare-Part-D-Released.pdf.)
(alteration in original). Because Medicare Part D pays more for drugs than Medicaid, the system has
essentially chosen to spend more for prescription drugs than is necessary. Some scholars have
proposed that consumers eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, sometimes called "dual-eligibles,"
should be moved back to Medicaid for their prescription drug coverage, arguing that it would lead to
lower prescription drug spending and better access to prescription drugs for patients. See Kevin
Outterson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, How Medicare Could Get Better Prices on Prescription Drugs,
HEALTH AFF. W832, w834-35 (2009).
91. See Sachs, supra note 69, at 2314.
92. Medicare Part D Brief supra note 67; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL 28 (2016), available at
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-
Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manua-Chapter-6.pdf.
93. Adelberg & Schlaifer, supra note 86.
94. See Medicare Part D Brief, supra note 67.
95. See id.
96. See id
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-I 11(i) (2012). See also Medicare Part D Brief supra note 67; Sachs,
supra note 69, at 2325-26 ("Often referred to as the noninterference clause, the statute provides that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) "may not interfere with the negotiations between
drug manufacturers and pharmacies and [Prescription Drug Plan] sponsors and "may not require a
18:2 (2019)
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with prescription drug manufacturers.98 The cost-sharing model and the
competition between Medicare Part D plans, both in attracting consumers and in
bidding for federal government contracts, incentivize them to negotiate
prescription drug prices as low as possible.99 Prescription drug spending, including
for high-cost brand name prescription drugs, is a concern under Medicare Part D.
In 2013, while the top ten drugs paid for by Medicare Part D plans were all generics
(306.6 million claims totaling $4.14 billion), the top ten most expensive were all
brand name prescription drugs (54.63 million claims totaling $19.78 billion). oo
The barriers to implementing indication-specific pricing in Medicare Part D
are perhaps more formidable than those present in Medicare Part B. The laws.
forbidding Medicare from negotiation with prescription drug manufacturers would
pose a challenge to implementing an effective indication-specific pricing scheme
in Medicare Part D. Because Medicare cannot negotiate as a whole, even though
individual Medicare Part D plans can negotiate with prescription drug
manufacturers, Medicare Part D plans cannot leverage the buying power of the
whole Medicare population.1"1 This negotiation model weakens the bargaining
power of Medicare Part D to lower prescription drug prices, likely making prices
higher than they would be if Medicare negotiated as a whole. However, this
limitation alone is not the most substantial barrier to lowering prescription drug
prices and spending.
The requirement hat Medicare Part D plans cover all prescription drugs in six
protected classes, which includes cancer drugs, further challenges the ability for
indication-specific pricing to lower prescription drug spending. 102 This regulation
significantly weakens Medicare Part D plans' negotiating power, leaving the
prescription drug manufacturers with all the bargaining power and forcing
manufacturers to accept high prices for these drugs.103 Even if the indication-
particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D drugs.").
98. See Medicare Part D Brief, supra note 67.
99. See Theodore T. Lee et al., The Politics of Medicare and Drug Price Negotiation
(Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/l 0.1377/hblog2Ol6O919.056632/ful1/.
100. See Nicole M. Gastala et al., Medicare Part D: Patients Bear The Cost Of 'Me Too'Brand
Name Drugs, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1237, 1238 (2016) (citing Press release, CMS releases prescriber-
level Medicare data for first time, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-
04-30.html)).
101. See Medicare Part D Brief, supra note 67.
102. See id.
103. See Thomas, supra note 14 ("'You get your largest negotiating power from your ability to
walk away,' said Dr. Aaron S. Kesselheim, an associate professor at Harvard Medical School who
has written frequently on drug prices."). See also Sachs, supra note 69, at 2326 ("Medicare might be
able to achieve some savings where there is already market competition and where Medicare is
permitted to cover two drugs in that class, although it is difficult to see why private plans have not
negotiated such deals already. But for the six protected classes in which Medicare must cover all
17
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specific price somewhat lowered the prices, the lack of negotiation power
undermines the ability of Medicare Part D plans to negotiate a price truly reflecting
the value. With this mandate still in place, not only would insurers be unable to
demand an indication-specific price for a high-cost cancer drug based on its value
to a patient population, but they would still be forced to accept inflated prices for
prescription drugs in these protected classes.
While the negative physician incentives present in Medicare Part B are not
present in Medicare Part D, the negative incentives for patients are significant.
Instead of the 20 percent co-insurance under Medicare Part B, beneficiaries under
Medicare Part D are responsible for a 25 percent co-insurance up to the
catastrophic cap of $4,950 and then 5 percent co-insurance after reaching the
catastrophic cap. 104 As many prescription drugs cost more than the catastrophic
cap, 105 many consumers face a significant and possibly prohibitive out-of-pocket
spending requirement. An indication-specific pricing regime would do nothing to
address the cost to patients unless the indication was less effective. If the relevant
indication of the prescription drug was a relatively less effective than other
treatments, it would cost relatively less and be more affordable to the patient at the
point of service. However, high-cost, high-value indications of prescription drugs
would remain expensive to both consumers and to the system, and an indication-
specific pricing model would give manufacturers and patients no incentives to
lower prices or seek better care options.
In addition to not addressing the affordability of drugs for patients, an
indication-specific pricing regime would do nothing to decrease the government's
overall prescription drug spending. Under Medicare Part D, a federal government
subsidy pays for 80 percent of prescription drug costs after the catastrophic cap is
reached; the reinsurance, or subsidy, portion of Medicare Part D is the fastest
growing Medicare Part D cost as so many prescription drugs now cost thousands
of dollars annually.'06 An indication-specific pricing regime would do nothing to
decrease or slow the reinsurance costs. Reforms to Medicare Part D should both
slow spending and improve patient access, and an indication-specific pricing
regime would accomplish neither.
B. Medicaid
Medicaid is the federal government health insurance program that provides
health insurance coverage for low-income people in the United States,107 covering
products, or for expensive new drugs with few, if any, substitutes, Medicare cannot walk away from
the table if it does not like the deal companies are offering.").
104. See Medicare Part D Brief, supra note 67.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. See About Us, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/index.html.
18:2 (2019)
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approximately seventy million Americans."8 It is one of the largest payers for
healthcare in the United States. 109 Medicaid is administrated by the states and
jointly funded by the states and the federal government. 10
Medicaid comprises approximately 20 percent of the prescription drug
market. "' Prescription drugs are a small but growing portion of Medicaid spending
(6 percent to 9 percent from 2010 to 2015).112 The growth rate of Medicaid
prescription drug spending in 2014 outpaced that of overall prescription drug
spending in the United States."3 While prescription drug coverage is an optional
benefit under Medicaid, all states currently cover prescription drug costs for
Medicaid beneficiaries. 114 Most states charge copayments for prescription drugs
purchased under Medicaid, but these copayments are very low, capped at a few
dollars per prescription and less than $30 per month. 115
The price Medicaid pays for prescription drugs is regulated by the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program and the Medicaid Best Price Rule. 116 Under the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program, prescription drug manufacturers receive Medicaid coverage
for essentially all of their prescription drug products in exchange for agreeing with
the Department of Health and Human Services to provide rebates to Medicaid, the
340B Drug Discount Program, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. 17 As long
as the prescription drug manufacturer participates in the Medicaid Drug Rebate
108. See Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html (68 million
covered as of the October 2017 open enrollment period); Medicaid State Fact Sheets, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 16, 2017), https://www.kff.org/interactive/medicaid-state-fact-sheets/ ("Medicaid and
the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provide health and long-term care coverage to more
than 70 million low-income children, pregnant women, adults, seniors, and people with disabilities
in the United States.").
109. See About Us, MEDICAID.GOV, supra note 107.
110. See Medicaid, supra note 108.
111. See Health Policy Brief: Veterans Health Administration, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb2Ol71008.000174/full/healthpolicybrief 174.pdf
[hereinafter Veterans Health Administration Brie/A.
112. See David Dranove et al., A Dose of Managed Care: Controlling Drug Spending in
Medicaid 9 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23956, Oct. 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23956.
113. See Hefei Wen et al., Number Of MedicaidPrescriptions Grew, Drug Spending Was Steady
In Medicaid Expansion States, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1604, 1604 (2016) (citing Anne B. Martin et al.,
National Health Spending in 2014: Faster Growth driven By Coverage Expansion and Prescription
Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 150 (2016)).
114. See Prescription Drugs, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/ (accessed Dec. 31, 2017).
115. See id. (presenting the prescription drug payments and copayments under Medicaid in each
state).
116. See Health Policy Brief: Medicaid Best Price, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 10, 2017),
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Program, states must cover all of the manufacturer's prescription drugs approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). " 8 Because prescription drug
manufacturers who do not participate in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program are
excluded from participating in all federal government health insurance programs
(a massive share of the prescription drug market), prescription drug manufacturers
are basically required to participate. 119
The value of the rebates is set by statute.120 Rebates are collected directly by
Medicaid. 121 State Medicaid programs are allowed to negotiate further discounts
in addition to these rebates. 122 For the majority of new, high-cost prescription drugs
(innovator drugs), Medicaid is entitled to a minimum of a 23.1 percent rebate off
the average manufacturer price. 123 The rebate is also subject to the Medicaid Best
Price Rule: if the lowest price offered by the prescription drug manufacturer is
lower than the price Medicaid would pay for the drug after the guaranteed rebate,
then Medicaid is entitled to pay for the lower price - the "best price."'124 Certain
programs are excluded from the Medicaid Best Price Rule, including Medicare
Part D, 125 Medicare Advantage plans, 126 the 340B Drug Discount Program,127 and
the Veterans Health Administration. 128 This means that these programs can receive
lower prices than those paid by Medicaid without triggering the Medicaid Best
Price Rule.
Medicaid raises significant legal and regulatory challenges to implementing
118. 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8. See Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Efforts to Cut Drug Prices in
Medicaid, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9f8fef25-
d 178-40f6-9cOb-9ee5 11 cO1 8e9.
119. See Medicaid Best Price Brief supra note 116.
120. See Drug Rebate Program, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program/index.html.
121. See Medicaid Best Price Brief, supra note 116.
122. See David Blumenthal & David Squires, Drug Price Control: How Some Government
Programs Do It, COMMONWEALTH FuND (May 10, 2016),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/may/drug-price-control-how-some-
government-programs-do-it.
123. See Medicaid Best Price Brief supra note 116; Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 7. Some other
products are subject to different minimum rebates: blood clotting factors and drugs approved by the
FDA for exclusively pediatric indications are subject to a minimum rebate of 17.1 percent off the
average manufacturer price, non-innovator drugs are subject to a minimum rebate of 13 percent of
the average manufacturer price per unit. See Drug Rebate Program, supra note 120.
124. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 7; Medicaid Best Price Brief, supra note 116. See also
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (Medicaid Drug Rebate Program and Best Price Rule statute).
125. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 7.
126. See id.




128. See Veterans Health Administration Brief, supra note 111.
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an indication-specific pricing model. 129 First, the Medicaid Best Price Rule applies
to the lowest price of each prescription drug, not each indication for a prescription
drug. 3° Implementing an indication-specific pricing regime without any
modification or guidance with respect to the Medicaid Best Price Rule would
require prescription drug manufacturers to accept the lowest price for any
indication of a product, thereby providing the prescription drug for high-value
indications at the cost for its lowest-value indications. 131 With a threat of the price
assigned to a lower value indication applying across the board to all indications of
the product, prescription drug manufacturers may be less likely, even
disincentivized, to research or seek approval for these lower value indications.
Additionally, as these Medicaid rebates are calculated based on the average
manufacturer price of a prescription drug, not the average manufacturer price of a
specific indication of a prescription drug,32 modifications to how Medicaid
calculates prescription drug prices would be necessary if implementing a pure
indication-specific pricing regime. Several potential solutions to this problem have
been recommended, including adopting a partial indication-specific pricing regime
(an average weighted price incorporating indication-specific prices), product
differentiation (seeking FDA approval for each indication as a different drug
product), and CMS redefining a drug as "a chemical compound approved for a
particular indication." 1
33
Despite the guaranteed rebates and the Medicaid Best Price Rule limiting
prescription drug prices, Medicaid spending on prescription drugs would likely
increase under an indication-specific pricing regime. As Medicaid prices are based
on the average sales price to other insurers, who would also have indication-
specific prices and likely pay high prices for high-value indications, even the lower
price paid by Medicaid would likely increase. This is further aggravated by the law
under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program requiring Medicaid and other federal
health insurance programs to cover all FDA-approved drugs by participating
prescription drug manufacturers. Even though state Medicaid programs can
negotiate additional discounts beyond the mandated Medicaid price, because
Medicaid programs cannot decline to cover most prescription drugs, their
bargaining power is significantly weakened. This lack of leverage and inability to
walk away, like the situation seen with Medicare Part D plans, prevents Medicaid
from negotiating true value-based, indication-specific prices. Medicaid reforms to
129. For an in-depth analysis of the Medicaid Best Price Rule as a barrier to implementing
value-based payment models, including indication-specific pricing, see generally Sachs et al., supra
note 14.
130. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 8.
131. See id.
132. See Medicaid Best Price Brief, supra note 116; Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 8.
133. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 8-9.
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prescription drug pricing would need to consider the strengths and weaknesses of
the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program and the Medicaid Best Price Rule, and
indication-specific pricing would worsen the problems of the current Medicaid
prescription drug pricing model.
C. 340B Drug Discount Program
The 340B Drug Discount Program mandates the sale of outpatient prescription
drugs to covered entities at reduced prices.1 34 Covered entities include federally
qualified health centers, certain disease specific programs, and publicly owned
hospitals with a disproportionate share hospital percentage1 35 of at least 11.75
percent.136 There were approximately 35,000 individual covered entity sites
registered by the Health Resources and Services Administration in 2016,137
encompassing approximately 45 percent of hospitals. 138 Covered entities are able
to purchase outpatient prescription drugs at significant discounts, approximately
20 to 50 percent off of the average manufacturer price. 139 This price can be no
higher than the net price paid by Medicaid after rebates.140 Prescription drug
manufacturers are allowed to sell outpatient prescription drugs to 340B-eligible
purchasers without triggering the Medicaid Best Price Rule, allowing and even
incentivizing further reductions.141 Purchases by covered entities totaled
approximately $12 billion in 2015, with savings estimated at $6 billion. 1
42
134. See 340B Brief supra note 127; MARK RILEY, WHITE PAPER: MAKING SENSE OF THE 340B
DRUG PROGRAM 1 (July 2012).
135. Disproportionate share hospitals are hospitals which serve a disproportionately large
number of low income and uninsured patients and are thus entitled to additional payments from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. See Disproportionate Share Hospitals, HEALTH RES.
& SERVS. ADMIN. (May 2018), https://www.hrsa.gov/opa/eligibility-and-
registration/hospitals/disproportionate-share-hospitals/index.html. The disproportionate share
percentage is calculated by statute and described by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
here: Disproportionate Share Hospital, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (last modified Oct. 4,
2018), https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-
payment/acuteinpatientpps/dsh.html. The requirements for a disproportionate share hospital
qualifying for the 340B program are codified in 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(L).
136. See 340B Brief, supra note 127.
137. See id.
138. See Blumenthal & Squires, supra note 122. A separate study reports that the 340B hospitals
constitute 51 percent of all hospital beds in 2016. See Peter B. Bach & Rachel E. Sachs, Expansion
of the Medicare 340B Payment Program: Hospital Participation, Prescribing Patterns and
Reimbursement, and Legal Challenges, J. AM. MED. ASs'N (2018) (citing Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. Cost reports, fiscal-year 2017, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-Files/Cost-Reports.).
139. See 340B Brief, supra note 127.
140. See id
141. See id.
142. See id. Other studies have estimated the difference in the purchase and reimbursement for
340B hospitals in 2017 provided $19.3 billion in profit. See Bach & Sachs, supra note 138 (citing
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Eligibility to participate in the 340B Drug Discount Program depends on the
facility, not the individual patient. 143 When an insured patient comes to a 340B
covered entity and receives a prescription for an outpatient prescription drug from
a physician associated with the 340B program, the pharmacy is allowed to dispense
the prescription drug purchased through the 340B program but receive
reimbursement through Medicare or commercial insurance at their rates." This
allows the covered entity to make a profit on the outpatient prescription drugs
purchased under the 340B Drug Discount Program; this is permitted because of
their status as a provider serving a large uninsured population. '45
The 340B Drug Discount Program, like Medicaid, calculates the discounted
price of prescription drugs based on the average manufacturer price of a
prescription drug, 146 not the average manufacturer price of a specific indication of
a prescription drug. In order to implement an indication-specific pricing model, the
340B Drug Discount Program would need to modify the way it calculates the cost
of prescription drugs. There has also been criticism of the 340B Drug Discount
Program continuing to receive mandatory drug discounts in an indication-specific
pricing scheme, with people opposing imposing additional discounts when a
prescription drug is already being sold at a value-based price. 147 If an indication-
specific pricing regime were implemented, it is possible that these discounts would
be modified or repealed, undermining the efforts of the program and increasing
prescription drug spending.
The high drug discounts in the 340B Drug Discount Program may incentivize
inappropriate care or overuse of prescription drugs.148 This is a result of the
revenue 340B-eligible providers receive from the reimbursement for prescription
drugs. 14 Some hospitals participating in the 340B Drug Discount Program are
abusing the system, gaining immense profits from their prescription drug sales,
The 340B program reached $19.3 billion in 2017-as hospitals' charity care has dropped, DRUG
CHANNELS INST. (May 7, 2018), https://www.drugchannels.net/2018/05/exclusive-340b-program-
reached-193.html). Because the program is structured such that the covered entity receives the
discount directly upon purchase, the program does not cost the taxpayers and the savings directly
help the covered entities to offset losses caused by their disproportionate coverage of uninsured
patients and focus on local healthcare priorities, including clinics and transportation in rural and low-
income areas. See Jim Martin, We can help rural seniors and veterans by keeping the 340B drug
pricing program, THE HILL (Nov. 4, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/358771-we-can-
help-rural-seniors-and-veterans-by-keeping-the-340b-drug-pricing.




147. See Bach & Pearson, supra note 8, at 2504.
148. 340B Brief, supra note 127.
149. See id.
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resulting in the system receiving increased public scrutiny. "0 These profits and
incentives for abuse could aggravated by an indication-specific pricing regime.
This is true of any fee-for-service program but would be even more likely in a
system that already incentivizes inappropriate prescribing.' 
51
While incentivizing prescribing high-value indications, indication-specific
pricing would also incentivize overuse of drugs for high-value indications and
increase overall drug spending. This could be especially prominent in certain
contexts, such as cancer care. Because 340B-eligible hospitals can purchase high-
price cancer drugs at deep discounts, there has already been a decrease in cancer
care by community oncologists and an increase in cancer care in hospital outpatient
departments, including 340B-eligible facilities. 152 If these discounts continue and
cancer care continues to be more affordable at 340B-eligible facilities, indication-
specific pricing could further exacerbate the increase in cancer care at 340B-
eligible facilities. Physicians may also be incentivized to try several different
prescription drugs to treat cancer at once, whether necessary or not. Overuse and
improper use would magnify an increase in drug spending from indication-specific
pricing. These challenges would need to be addressed for an indication-specific
pricing model to decrease, not increase, prescription drug prices and spending
under the 340B Drug Discount Program.
D. Veterans Health Administration
The Department of Veterans Affairs operates its own integrated healthcare
system called the Veterans Health Administration (VA), providing healthcare
services to qualified members of the military after they leave active duty.'53 The
VA directly provides services, including prescription drugs, through its network of
medical centers, clinics, and pharmacies. "'
Prescription drug manufacturers are required to provide the VA and the
150. See Andrew Pollack, Dispute Develops Over Drug Discount Program, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
12, 203), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/business/dispute-develops-over-340b-discount-drug-
program.html; Ellen Weaver & Lindsay Boyd, States tell Congress: stop hospital abuse offederal
drug discount program, THE HILL (June 15, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/healthcare/283491 -states-tell-congress-stop-hospital-abuse-of-federal-drug.
151. See Weaver & Boyd, supra note 150 ("The Berkeley findings come on top of previous
research that revealed that most 340B hospitals don't actually serve large at-risk populations. One
study found that fewer than a third provide charity care exceeding the national average. And last
summer, the Government Accountability Office issued a report noting that the program creates an
incentive for hospitals to maximize profits by prescribing more-or more expensive--drugs. GAO
then tasked Congress with removing these perverse incentives.").
152. See 340B Brief, supra note 127.
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Department of Defense a 24 percent discount15 on the non-federal average
manufacturer price. 156 Similar to the Medicaid Best Price Rule, if the prescription
drug manufacturer sells their product to another non-federal buyer for less than
that amount, they are required to sell to the VA for the lowest price. 157
The VA operates its prescription drug coverage as a national formulary, a list
of medicines covered by the VA. 158 The VA provides low or no cost sharing for
its beneficiaries and low costs overall. 5 9 The buying power of the VA allows it to
negotiate additional discounts for many of the drugs on the national formulary,
especially those drugs with significant competitors.'60 Further, unlike Medicare
and Medicaid, which are required to cover all FDA-approved prescription drugs,
the VA is not required to cover all FDA-approved prescription drugs; the ability
of the VA to decline to include a drug on its national formulary gives it
significantly more bargaining power than other federal payers.'61 If prescription
drug manufacturers do not comply with the mandated discounts to the VA, they
are excluded from participating in most federal government health insurance
programs. 162 As federal government health insurers compose such a large portion
of the pharmaceutical market, prescription drug manufacturers generally
comply. 1
63
The VA would face barriers to indication-specific pricing of prescription
drugs similar to those faced by other federal health insurance programs. Like the
other federal programs, the VA calculates its prescription drug prices based on the
average manufacturer price of the prescription drug. "6 The average manufacturer
price does not differentiate based on the indication for which the prescription drug
is prescribed. In order to implement an indication-specific pricing regime, the VA
would have to change the way it calculates the price of prescription drugs.
However, it may be easier in this context to track and collect the necessary data for
charging an indication-specific pricing, as the VA is one integrated system instead
155. See Blumenthal & Squires, supra note 122.
156. The non-federal average manufacturer price is defined by statute as "the weighted average
price of a single form and dosage unit of the drug that is paid by wholesalers in the United States to
the manufacturer, taking into account any cash discounts or similar price reductions during that
period, but not taking into account (A) any prices paid by the Federal Government; or (B) any prices
found by the Secretary to be merely nominal in amount." Veterans Health Administration Brief
supra note 11 1(quoting 38 U.S.C. § 8126).
157. See Blumenthal & Squires, supra note 122.




162. See Veterans Health Administration Brief supra note 111.
163. See id.
164. See id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 8126).
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of independent healthcare providers under Medicare. 165 It may be possible to
implement an indication-specific pricing system in the VA prescription drug
program, but there are still several barriers to indication-specific pricing lowering
prescription drug spending in the United States healthcare system.
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDICATION-SPECIFIC PRICING
The legal and regulatory barriers to implementing an indication-specific
pricing scheme in federal government insurance programs are significant and
worthy of consideration, but they are not insurmountable.166 If accomplished,
implementing indication-specific pricing in government health insurance
programs would have a significant impact on and face additional barriers with the
FDA approval system and incentives for physicians, patients, and manufacturers.
Section A discusses the barriers presented by the FDA approval system. Section B
explains the risks of liability for off-label promotion. Section C presents the
arguments regarding whether indication-specific pricing would decrease
prescription drug spending, concluding that an indication-specific pricing model
would likely not decrease prices or improve consumers' access to prescription
drugs. Section D raises ethical arguments against indication-specific pricing and
other value-based pricing models.
A. The FDA Approval System
The current FDA approval system poses significant barriers to an effective
indication-specific pricing regime. Each FDA-approved drug receives a unique
National Drug Code (NDC). 167 This NDC is used when tracking and calculating
the reimbursement price for prescription drugs. The FDA approves prescription
drugs for specific indications, not general use.168 This is because the safety,
effectiveness, and risk-benefit analysis may differ for a prescription drug based on
indications. 169 For example, a side effect that is harmless for one indication in one
patient may be a significant risk for another indication in a different patient. Thus,
when a prescription drug has more than one indication, manufacturers must
consider how to gain approval for the new use.
Manufacturers have several options to gain FDA approval for new indications.
One possibility is to have the new indication approved as a separate product. This
165. See id.
166. See Bach, supra note 18, at 1630 ("Adopting indication-[specific] pricing is thus
technically feasible. Political challenges may be more substantial.").
167. See National Drug Code Directory, supra note 78.
168. Ryan Sila, Note, Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Testing in an Age of Off-Label Promotion,
93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 941, 946 (2018).
169. Id. at 946-48.
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could be done by submitting an Investigational New Drug Application7 ' to gain
FDA approval to research the new indications and then conducting full clinical
trials (the traditional process for FDA approval). 171 The newly approved indication
for the prescription drug would be approved as a unique product.172 It would
receive a unique NDC from the FDA, and it would be billed as a separate product
by insurers. Another more common option is for the prescription drug
manufacturer to file a supplemental New Drug Application 173 to update the label
and gain approval for this new indication. This results in adding an indication to
an already approved prescription drug. Therefore, the product has the same NDC
code and must be billed and priced the same under the existing FDA regulatory
scheme.
In order to implement an indication-specific pricing model, the FDA and CMS
would need to develop a new or modified coding system incorporating the separate
indications with approvals and reimbursements. While New Drug Applications
would benefit the healthcare system by providing detailed support on the
effectiveness of the new indication, there is no incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to follow this route. It is time-intensive, labor-intensive, and expensive.
Pharmaceutical companies are more likely to file supplemental New Drug
Applications, which are quicker and require less support and expenditure.
However, this results in a new indication with the same NDC as the existing
product. The FDA and CMS would need to develop a system to track the different
indications of individual NDC codes for reimbursement purposes. Further,
physicians can prescribe these medications without the additional approvals.
174
170. See 21 C.F.R. § 312; Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADM1N. (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDruglNDApplication/default.htm.
171. Id. If the product is a breakthrough therapy, a cancer drug with no comparable treatment,
or certain other types of treatments, the manufacturer may be eligible to gain approval by submitting
an application through an Accelerated Approval pathway. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a) (breakthrough
therapies); 21 U.S.C. § 356(b) (fast-track products); 21 CFR 314.510; Accelerated Approval, U.S.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405447.htm.
172. Id.
173. See 21 CFR § 314; New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMiN. (Mar. 29,
2016),
https://www. fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDAdefault.htm; Off-Label Drug Promotion: Health
Policy Brief HEALTH AFF. (June 30, 2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb2Ol60630.920075/full/healthpolicybrief 159.pdf
[hereinafter Off-Label Drug Promotion Briej] ("Currently, a manufacturer can expand a drug's
approved indications through a supplemental New Drug Application, but performing the required
clinical trials is a costly and time- consuming process, and manufacturers have little incentive to do
this for drugs that are al- ready used widely off label.").
174. See III.B., infra.
27
Knox: More Prices, More Problems: Challenging Indication-Specific Prici
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
These challenges are further described in the next Section.
B. Off-Label Prescribing
Not all indications for which prescription drugs are used are approved by the
FDA. 175 While some prescription drugs are approved for multiple indications,
many prescription drugs are only approved for one indication, even if they are
commonly used for other indications. 176 Using prescription drugs for uses other
than their approved indications is called off-label use. 177 Both off-label prescribing
and off-label use are permitted. 178 However, off-label promotion of prescription
drugs by prescription drug manufacturers is prohibited.179 Drug company
promotion of a prescription drug for a non-approved use is in contradiction with
the approved labeling and qualifies as "misbranding" under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.'80
175. See Off-Label Drug Promotion Brief supra note 173, ("A drug is used off label any time
it is administered in a way that has not been approved by the FDA... Providers might choose to
prescribe off label for many reasons.").
176. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 9-10 ("There are many drugs like Colcrys, with multiple
FDA-approved indications. But there are also many drugs whose secondary uses are not FDA
approved, with large off-label markets.").
177. Off-Label Drug Promotion Brief" Health Policy Brief supra note 173 ("A drug is used off
label any time it is administered in a way that has not been approved by the FDA.").
178. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Prospects For Regulation Of Off-Label
Drug Promotion In An Era Of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539,
1546 (2014) ("Once a drug is approved, physicians have autonomy to prescribe it for any indication
and patient population and at any dose, including those not described in the official labeling
materials-so-called 'off-label' uses. Off-label uses are often medically appropriate, especially for
patients with no other therapeutic alternatives where the drug's effectiveness is biologically
plausible." (footnote omitted)).
179. See id. at 1544 ("The FDCA does not explicitly proscribe off-label drug promotion. Rather,
it prohibits introducing any new drug or biological product that has not been approved by the FDA
or is misbranded. (citing, id at 1544 n.22, "21 U.S.C. § 33 1(d) (2012); id. § 355(a) ("No person shall
introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of
an application ... is effective .... "); id. § 331(a) (forbidding the introduction of adulterated or
misbranded food or drugs into commerce); id. § 352(a) (defining false or misleading labels as
misbranded drugs or devices); id § 352(f) (discussing directions for use and warnings on labels).").
180. See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 178, at 1547 ("A manufacturer who promotes off-
label uses risks criminal liability under the FDCA if its drug is found to be 'misbranded.' Drugs can
be misbranded for false or misleading labeling information or labeling that does not bear 'adequate
directions for use.' Since the only legitimate source of information about directions for use is the
FDA-approved labeling information, directions provided by the manufacturer for using the drug in
an off-label context are not permitted. The combination of the requirements for approval and the
misbranding provision provide two avenues for restrictions on off-label promotion: a drug promoted
for unapproved uses may be considered to be an "unapproved drug" for that use, or it may be deemed
'misbranded.' Under either statutory provision, in the FDA's view, it can be illegal for a drug's
labeling to discuss uses of the drug that the FDA has not validated as being supported by substantial
evidence." (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012); id. § 352(f)(1))).
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While manufacturers are allowed to make certain statements about non-
approved uses (for example in response to a request by a healthcare
professional'1), manufacturers can only negotiate reimbursement for FDA-
approved indications.182 Even so, insurers in the United States, including
Medicare, will generally reimburse providers for prescription drugs even when
they are prescribed off-label; however, this could be because insurers cannot tell
when drugs are prescribed off-label. 183 Medicare Part B is required to reimburse
for off-label use of oncology drugs when there is specific published evidence
supporting their use. 184
Off-label prescribing is relatively common, accounting for approximately 20
percent of all prescriptions in the United States.185 In some cases, off-label
prescribing is beneficial and necessary: some subpopulations (including children
and pregnant women) often require off-label prescribing as they are generally not
included as subjects in clinical trials, and thus are not included in the FDA
approval. 186 Some specialties with few treatments for specific indications, such as
oncology, result in off-label uses of prescription drugs becoming the standard of
care.187 Despite the benefits, there is little scientific evidence supporting the
effectiveness of over 70 percent of off-label uses of prescription drugs.
188
Permitting drug companies to promote these uses, even allowing them to negotiate
reimbursement for their use, may pose great public health risks. Off-label uses lack
evidence supporting their safety and effectiveness for treating the non-indicated
disease. As off-label prescribing is common absent promotion by manufacturers,
permitting such promotion may result in more widespread use of drugs for off-
label indications. This would lead to patients gaining access to prescription drugs
181. See Off-Label Drug Promotion Brief: Health Policy Brief supra note 173 ("Manufacturers
can communicate about off-label uses of their drugs in a number of ways. Companies are permitted
to respond to unsolicited requests from health care professionals about unapproved uses and might
also support independent continuing medical education activities at which off-label uses are
discussed. Since the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of
1997, companies are also permit- ted to distribute peer-reviewed journals and reference books that
discuss off-label uses, although this practice is subject to certain limitations. In 2014 the FDA
expanded this authority to include non-peer-reviewed clinical practice guidelines.").
182. See Stephen D. Pearson, et al., Indication-specific pricing of pharmaceuticals in the US
healthcare system, 6 J. COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 397, 399-400 (2017).
183. See Off-Label Drug Promotion Brief: Health Policy Brief, supra note 173 ("Payers in the
United States, including Medicare, generally reimburse medications used off-label.., in 2009, 75
percent of U.S. payers reimbursed some off-label uses of prescription drugs.").
184. See id ("Medicare Part B is required to cover anti-cancer drugs used o -label when
published compendia-privately owned pharmaceutical reference guides-support heir use.").
185. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 9, at 20.
186. See Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78
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much faster than if manufacturers sought FDA approval through clinical trials or
a supplemental New Drug Application. However, as there is a lack of evidence
over the safety and effectiveness of the drug for the off-label use and off-label uses
are associated with "significantly higher rates of adverse events than on-label
uses,"189 increased off-label use could lead to adverse events and negative health
outcomes. 190
Linking the price of a prescription drug to its FDA-approved indications
would be possible. However, while the 2 1 st Century Cures Act expanded the ability
of prescription drug manufacturers to share information on off-label uses, the FDA
has only provided draft guidance, and sharing this information would likely still
qualify as prohibited off-label promotion. 191 Companies may be able to find ways
to promote their prescription drugs notwithstanding the off-label promotion
prohibitions. Recently, several companies have succeeded on challenging these
restrictions on First Amendment grounds, asserting that this is protected truthful
commercial speech.192 Companies could be extend these First Amendment
challenges to the payment context, arguing that pharmaceutical companies should
be allowed to negotiate with government health insurance programs using
scientific evidence supporting the effectiveness of non-approved indications. The
development of commercial speech doctrine does not indicate that this is likely, as
courts have not yet extended First Amendment protection to unapproved
indications. 193
Without requiring or incentivizing FDA approval for the additional
indications, indication-specific pricing may not be a practical solution. However,
if prescription drug manufacturers were incentivized to seek FDA approval for new
indications, this would cause a deluge of Investigational New Drug Applications'
94
to gain FDA approval to research the new indications; supplemental New Drug
189. Id. at 1079.
190. See id. at 1078-79.
191. See Hayes, supra note 19.
192. See Zettler, supra note 186, at 1057 ("Notwithstanding these concerns, courts, increasingly,
have seemed willing to find that the First Amendment protects a broader range of off-label promotion
than FDA policies have typically permitted."); Sila, supra note 168, at 950 ("[the Second Circuit" it
held that the effective prohibition of off-label marketing did not directly advance those interests and
in any event was substantially more restrictive than the First Amendment permits."); Amarin Pharma,
Inc. v. U.S. F.D.A. 119 F.Supp.3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d
Cir. 2012). See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (explaining that the First
Amendment protects companies' rights to engage in truthful commercial speech).
193. See Zettler, supra note 186, at 1071 ("none of the decisions following Caronia-in the
Second Circuit or elsewhere-have xtended Caronia to unapproved products.").
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 312; Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
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Applications 195 to gain FDA approval for the indication; and applications through
Accelerated Approval pathways for breakthrough therapies and prescription drugs
that treat cancers with no comparable treatment. 196 Seeking approval for these
additional indications as new indications for an existing product would make
indication-specific pricing a more real possibility. 197 These additional studies and
approvals may provide additional data on the safety and effectiveness of certain
prescription drugs, especially as data on off-label uses of prescription drugs are
often inadequate.98 Despite the benefits of the additional research that comes with
approval, FDA approval is unnecessary for patients to access these medicines and
may not improve affordability. Research time and a lengthy approval process
greatly delay patient access and undermine the goal of improving affordability and
accessibility of prescription drugs.
Indication-specific pricing would face several regulatory and practical barriers
in the FDA approval system and with the risk of liability for off-label promotion.
Reforms in these two areas would be necessary in order to make indication-specific
pricing feasible. Even so, these reforms may not address the end goal of
prescription drug reform: decreasing prescription drug prices and spending. The
possible economic effects of indication-specific pricing are discussed further in the
next Section.
C. Price Effects of Indication-Specific Pricing
Experts disagree on whether an indication-specific pricing regime would
decrease prescription drug spending. In general, supporters argue that indication-
195. See 21 CFR § 314; New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMTN. (Mar. 29,
2016),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm; Off-Label Drug Promotion Brief,
supra note 173 ("Currently, a manufacturer can expand a drug's approved indications through a
supplemental New Drug Application, but performing the required clinical trials is a costly and time-
consuming process, and manufacturers have little incentive to do this for drugs that are al- ready used
widely off label.").
196. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(a) (breakthrough therapies); 21 U.S.C. § 356(b) (fast-track products);
21 CFR 314.510; Accelerated Approval, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405447.htm.
197. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 6.
198. See id; Sila, supra note 168, at 951 ("critics argue that the prohibition powerfully
incentivizes manufacturers to conduct clinical testing of and seek approval for more than just a single
indication.") (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007) (explaining that because the FDA requires that "firms
conduct rigorous clinical trials before bringing their products to market and before making
promotional claims... the FDA plays an important structural role in promoting a valuable form of
biomedical R&D [research and development] that private firms are undermotivated to perform...
while internalizing the costs of this R&D to the firms").
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specific pricing would "reduce prices for low-value indications but that prices for
high-value indications will not increase."199 Many studies do not support this
assertion, however. Evidence suggests that an indication-specific pricing model
would not result in the desired policy incentives and effects - rational use of
prescription drugs, more affordable prices for prescription drugs, and lower overall
prescription drug spending. The core goal of indication-specific pricing of
prescription drugs, like other value-based pricing regimes, is to make prescription
200drug prices better represent he value received by the patient. While maximizing
value is important, it does not solve the problem of high prescription drug prices
and spending.
Peter Bach, a physician and researcher at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer
Center and a prominent supporter of indication-specific pricing in oncology care,
argues that indication-specific pricing would likely decrease prescription drug
spending.21 Dr. Bach has recommended anchoring the prices of a prescription
drug to its highest value indication or setting the price based on a preset value per
year of life gained.2 02 He has calculated the changes in prices of multi-indication
cancer drugs based both on setting the price of the highest-value indication to the
current price and by monthly price based on a cost of $150,000 per year of life
gained.20 3 The large variations in value by indication, he argues, demonstrate that
indication-specific pricing is necessary to make prescription drug prices rationally
related to value .2 04 However, his methodology presupposes that indication-specific
pricing would decrease prescription drug prices, and therefore Dr. Bach's analysis
does not provide support for this conclusion.0 5
In fact, indication-specific pricing would likely increase prescription drug
spending. Amitabh Chandra from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government
and Craig Garthwaite from Northwestern University's Kellogg School of
199. Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103 (citing Bach, supra note 18, at 1629-30).
200. But see Bach, supra note 18, at 1629-30 ("The primary reason to pursue this enhancement
to the system [implementing indication-specific pricing] is to make it possible to rationalize drug
pricing.").
201. See Flume, et al., supra note 46 ("Frequent pricing critic Peter Bach recently suggested
that paying by indication could save money in cancer using the example of cetuximab, which is much
less effective in advanced head and neck cancer (estimated value-based price: $470) compared with
colorectal cancer (estimated value-based price: $10,320)." (citing Bach, supra note 18)).
202. See Bach, supra note 18, at 1629.
203. See id. at 1630.
204. See id. at 1629 ("However, the relative findings of large differences in value across
indications, and large potential shifts in pricing if the drugs were linked to value, illustrate that a
change to indication-based pricing may be a necessary step to- ward paying rational prices for
expensive drugs used to treat cancer and some other conditions, for which efficacy varies across
indications.").
205. See id. at 1630 (noting the methodology "Assumes the price of the drug in its most effective
setting is the appropriate reference price.").
18:2 (2019)
32
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 18 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol18/iss2/5
MORE PRICES, MORE PROBLEMS
Management have argued that indication-specific pricing would not decrease the
price of prescription drugs and would therefore not decrease prescription drug
spending.2" 6 Instead, they argue that more effective, and supposedly higher value,
indications would increase in price, making prescription drugs even more
unaffordable (particularly to those who need them most). Their analysis
demonstrates that "relative to uniform pricing, indication-[specific] pricing results
in higher prices for patients who benefit the most, higher utilization by patients
who benefit least, higher overall spending, and higher manufacturer profits."20 7
They assert that "setting a price that more closely matches the product's value to
each customer," is a well understood economic concept called price
discrimination.20 8 Price discrimination, while resulting in a value-based price, can
result in manufacturers setting the highest price that each segment of the market is
willing to pay. 209 Calculating their own indication-specific prices for cancer drugs,
Professors Chandra and Garthwaite conclude that prices for high-value indications,
both for prescription drugs that are currently expensive and those that are generally
affordable, would drastically increase, significantly reducing patient access.2 10
No pure indication-specific pricing regime has yet been implemented, so there
is no real-world data to support pricing outcomes in practice. All outcomes are
hypothetical and presumptive. The available evidence and incentives support that
indication-specific pricing would likely increase prescription drug prices and
spending. High-cost prescription drugs may be cost-effective at their current high
prices: one study found that Sovaldi was cost-effective at $84,000 per treatment.211
Relatedly, high-value prescription drugs that are currently priced low enough to be
generally available would likely see drastic price increases.212 Indication-specific
206. See generally Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21.
207. Id. at 103-04.
208. Id. at 104.
209. See id. at 104 ("What would happen if the manufacturer used indication-[specific]
pricing-setting a price that more closely matches the product's value to each customer? This is a
practice that economists call price discrimination, and its effects are well understood. In the most
extreme version, the manufacturer extracts the most money each patient is willing to pay, leaving no
consumer surplus.").
210. See id. at 105 ("Absent indication-based pricing, the manufacturer could not set such a high
price without having payers reduce access for patients with low-value indications-the trade-off
would not be worth the lost profits. So what would indication- based pricing accomplish? For drugs
currently priced so high that they're unavailable for some indications, it expands access. Drug
manufacturers would now be willing to set low prices for low-value indications, since it wouldn't
jeopardize their profits on high-value indications. But the same access-expanding pricing flexibility
also allows manufacturers to increase prices for high- value indications. Currently, some treatments
are priced low enough to be accessible for a wide range of indications, and it is there that we should
expect the biggest price increases.").
211. Kesselheim et al., supra note 12, at 859 (citing Mehdi Najafzadeh et al., Cost-effectiveness
of novel regimens for the treatment of hepatitis C virus, 162 ANN. INTERN. MED. 407 (2015)).
212. See id.
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pricing in many cases, especially for diseases with few alternative treatments, may
not result in decreased prices and may perpetuate the prohibitively high prices
leaving these drugs out of reach to many patients. Even so, some expensive
prescription drugs may become more available; this would be the case for
prescription drugs that are overpriced beyond their cost-effectiveness.2 3 The low-
value indications would be more available and more utilized, as their prices are
lowered to match their comparative value making them more affordable to
214patients.   This increased access may have counterintuitive results in terms of
healthcare outcomes; while increased access to effective treatments would lead to
better healthcare outcomes, increased access to low-value indications (which are
perhaps not the standard of care or not adequately effective in treating the
secondary indication) would likely lead to poorer healthcare outcomes.
Without an experimental implementation of indication-specific pricing of
prescription drugs, it is uncertain whether indication-specific pricing would in fact
increase or decrease overall prescription drug spending and individual prescription
drug prices. However, the incentives are clear. Indication-specific pricing sets
higher prices for higher-value indications. Depending on an individual's
prescription drug coverage, these higher prices for high-value indications are likely
less affordable and less accessible as a result. Conversely, indication-specific
pricing sets lower prices for lower-value indications, resulting in them being more
affordable, more accessible, and used more by patient populations who receive a
comparatively lesser benefit from them.21 5 This could lead to an inefficient
allocation of prescription drugs and healthcare resources, overall worse healthcare
outcomes, and increased healthcare spending.
D. Ethical Issues of Indication-Specific Pricing
Indication-specific pricing raises several ethical concerns. First and foremost
is the ethical distribution of medicines. Indication-specific pricing models suggest
that indication-specific pricing in federal government health insurance programs
would result in higher prices for more-effective treatments. This regime may
demonstrate the value of the medication and incentivize the development of more
effective treatments for diseases. In this system, when a patient seeks to buy a more
effective medication to treat their disease, it would cost them significantly more
money. While the intent of pricing based on value per indication may be to better
allocate resources at the health system level, there are challenges to this working
at the patient level. What if an individual cannot afford the most effective
treatment? There could be prohibitively high out of pocket costs preventing them
213. See Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 105.
214. See id.
215. See Chandra & Garthwaite, supra note 21, at 103-04.
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from affording the medication that would best treat, or potentially cure, them.
Either this individual will go without treatment and get sicker, later costing the
healthcare system more money and having a significantly decreased quality of life,
or the individual chooses a less expensive, less effective treatment, which may
have poorer outcomes for the patient and result in expensive future healthcare to
improve their condition. The purpose of decreasing prescription drug prices is not
to justify high prices or to make them more rational; the point is that prescription
drug prices are too high for patients, and thus reforms need to both rationalize
prices but also make prescription drugs more affordable and accessible. Indication-
specific pricing may provide ethical and optimal prescriber-side incentives
(rewarding physicians for choosing the most effective, most valuable treatment)
but it punishes patients who cannot afford effective prescription drugs. This is
unethical and unjust.
The inverse pricing scheme has been suggested for the indication-specific
model: making the most effective treatment for an indication the most affordable
and therefore most accessible to patients. On the patient-side, this is ideal,
assuming this low price for a high-value indication is low enough that anyone and
everyone who needs it can afford it. But the physician and system incentives are
less clear, and potentially against the best interests of patients and the health system
as a whole. If the current physician reimbursement schemes continue, particularly
in Medicare Part B, this inverse indication-specific pricing model would not
incentivize physicians to provide the best course of treatment. In fact, they might
be incentivized to provide less effective treatments. Patients may receive a lower
standard of care from their physicians because it financially benefits their provider,
and as a result the healthcare system will produce poorer outcomes and higher
spending. Pharmaceutical companies would also have questionable incentives
under this model. Lower prices for effective drugs disincentivizes the development
of cures and effective treatments. When pharmaceutical companies identify
treatments that may not be more effective than existing treatments or have little
benefit to patients, the company would be incentivized to continue research and
development and seek approval for several indications. From an innovation and
research perspective, this is a positive: decreased off-label prescribing and
additional data on prescription drugs prior to approval. However, this incentivizes
companies to direct resources away from breakthrough cures and towards less
effective, more profitable treatments. Innovation incentives should not support
increases in pharmaceutical profits absent improvements in patient care.
The determination of value for indication-specific pricing, or any value-based
pricing, also raises ethical issues. What is value? Should determinations of value
be based on survival time, improved quality of life, or other outcomes
benchmarks? When comparing value determinations, and therefore price
determinations, across indications, there are further concerns. Is treating certain
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indications considered inherently more valuable than others such that the prices
are higher for effective treatments? For example, should all cancer treatments be
considered more valuable and therefore inherently more expensive than a
treatment for chronic back pain? Taken a step further, should a cancer treatment
with little to no benefit in most patients cost more than a prescription drug that
treats chronic back pain, removing virtually all symptoms, in 99 percent of cases?
While that thought experiment is an extreme (not to mention unsupported and
unlikely) example, these are the kinds of determinations made in value
assessments.216 Inevitably, value assessments will incentivize companies to
develop treatments for certain diseases more than others. This is one of the reasons
that rare diseases (which have small populations and therefore small
pharmaceutical markets) receive increased attention from the FDA in terms of
accelerated approval pathways and incentives for companies that develop
treatments. These may not take into account patient perspectives, particularly in
terms of approved quality of life. Disability advocates commonly criticize the use
of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) as a healthcare metric and raise the potential
for disastrous consequences if it is used broadly and incorrectly.2 17 The metric used
to determine value in an indication-specific pricing regime would need to be
carefully constructed to limit the discriminatory effects. Even with careful
consideration, it may be impossible to remove discriminatory effects entirely. It is
inevitable that an indication-specific pricing regime will prioritize certain outcome
measures while disadvantaging other outcomes - and patients.
IV. ALTERNATIVE REFORMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS
The incentive effects of indication-specific pricing of prescription drugs
contradict the overall goals of prescription drug reform: decreasing prescription
drug spending, decreasing prescription drug prices, and increasing the accessibility
and affordability of high-value prescription drugs. It is thus clear that in order to
decrease prescription drug spending, other models for prescription drug pricing
should be pursued. Section A suggests alternative value-based pricing models that
216. See Peter J. Neumann et al., ShouldA Drug's Value Depend On The Disease Or Population
It Treats? Insights From ICER's Value Assessments, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2Ol81105.38350/full! ("A central question facing
ICER - and by proxy all of us as health plan enrollees, taxpayers, and patients - is whether a drug's
value should depend on not only its "generic benefit" - e.g., as measured by quality adjusted life
years (QALYs) gained - but also on which disease or population it treats. For example, should ICER
invoke higher (i.e., more lenient) cost-per-QALY gained cost-effectiveness benchmarks in some
areas (say, cancer or rare diseases) than others and, if so, on what basis?").
217. Ari Ne'eman, Formulary Restrictions Devalue And Endanger The Lives of Disabled
People, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/l 0.1377/hblog20181025.42661/full/ (criticizing using QALYs as a
cost effectiveness measure in determining which drugs to exclude from formularies).
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lawmakers could consider in prescription drug reform instead of indication-
specific pricing. Section B introduces alternative policy interventions that
lawmakers should explore to decrease prescription drug prices and spending.
Section C concludes with recommendations for future legislative action.
A. Other Value-Based Pricing Models for Prescription Drugs
Value should be incorporated in the pricing of prescription drugs. Different
value-based pricing models could be explored by lawmakers, but would probably
not be more likely to decrease prescription drug spending than indication-specific
pricing.
Average weighted pricing for multi-indication prescription drugs could be
more feasible to implement than indication-specific pricing but would likely not
be more effective.21 8 Average weighted pricing assigns the price of a prescription
drug based on the weighted average value of the prices of each indication for the
prescription drug.219 Unlike a pure indication-specific pricing regime, average-
weighted pricing would not face the difficulties of pricing a drug per indication
where the system does not track the indication for which a drug is prescribed or
recognize differential reimbursement by indication.
However, it is unlikely that an average weighted price would have a
significant impact on prescription drug prices or spending. High-value indications
that are largely used would likely dominate the pricing calculation, maintaining
the high costs of multi-indication prescription drugs. Thus, while average weighted
pricing may avoid many of the legal and regulatory barriers related to indication-
specific pricing, it would likely provide no benefits in access or affordability to
patients and do little or nothing to reduce prescription drug spending.
Outcome-based payments could be another value-based model worth
exploring.220 Instead of directly increasing the cost of high-value indications,
outcome-based payments tie the cost of a prescription drug to the outcomes of an
individual patient or patient population either by adjusting the initial price to reflect
value or providing a rebate based on an individual patient's outcome.2 1 Several
prescription drug companies have entered into outcome-based contracts in the
218. See PEARSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 19 ("Lastly, using a single weighted-average price
is far more feasible in the current environment than trying to track indication-specific use and
applying different discounts to each indication. The latter approach, although a more 'pure' form of
indication-specific pricing, is more likely to create a price that triggers Medicaid best price
provisions; it also presents the greatest potential challenges for sorting out and describing to
stakeholders how patients and providers are affected by different prices for different indications.").
219. See id. at 11-12.
220. See Sachs et al., supra note 14, at 6.
221. See id. at 10.
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222private sector, and recently the federal government expressed interest in
experimenting with outcome-based payment models for prescription drugs for
chronic disease treatment.223 However, the impact of outcomes-based contracts on
prescription drug spending is unclear.224 One recent outcomes-based contract
involving Novartis' Kymriah, a drug used for a type of leukemia, resulted in
payment only if the patient received a positive response by the end of the first
month of treatment; even so, the value-based, outcome-based payment was
$475,000.225
This case raises doubt as to whether such contracts in the cancer context would
actually save money. If prices are set low enough and very specific outcomes
benchmarks are set and tracked, it is possible that these contracts could save
money. However, such terms would need to be negotiated with and agreed upon
by pharmaceutical companies, which seems unlikely. More research should be
done on the broader incentive effects of outcome-based payment models,
specifically regarding prescription drug prices, overall prescription drug spending,
and patient access to prescription drugs. Outcomes based contracts in practice may
incentivize pharmaceutical companies to negotiate extremely low or easy to
achieve outcomes benchmarks that do not fully demonstrate effectiveness
improved quality of life in a patient. Alternatively, companies may emphasize
patient perspectives to seek very subjective and potentially clinically insignificant
benchmarks. Such contracts would lead to virtually certain payment to prescription
drug companies and may do nothing to lower prices for many drugs if the overall
value of the contract is not significantly less than the current price. If these
benchmarks are not representative of the value of the drug, these prices would
likely increase independent of the effectiveness of the prescription drug. With
these assumed incentives, prescription drug prices and overall spending would
increase, leading to poorer patient access. Unless aggressive negotiating power is
given to federal government insurance programs such that they can overcome these
222. See id. at 10-11.
223. See Robert Saunders et al., Medicare Accountable Care Organization Results For 2016:
Seeing Improvement, Transformation Takes Time, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171120.211043/full/ ("effective prescription drug
use is essential to effective management of most chronic diseases that have significant population
health impacts.... As CMMI has recently highlighted, one opportunity is implementing value-based
payment reforms for drugs that share overall spending and health outcome accountability with drug
manufacturers to advance the movement away from fee-for-service.").
224. See, e.g., ELIZABETH SEELEY & AARON S. KESSELHEIM, OUTCOMES-BASED
PHARMACEUTICAL CONTRACTS: AN ANSWER TO HIGH U.S. DRUG SPENDING? 1 (Sept. 2017).
225. See Daniel et al., supra note 26; Novartis receives first ever FDA approval for a CAR-T
cell therapy, Kymriah(TM) (CTLO19), for children and young adults with B-cell ALL that is
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incentives for prescription drug companies, outcomes-based contracts for
prescription drugs would not decrease prescription drug prices and spending.
B. Other Policies to Lower Prescription Drug Prices
Other reforms should be considered instead of, or in conjunction with, value-
based pricing models. Value-based pricing models have garnered great support and
attention from politicians and healthcare professionals, but they only focus on one
type of intervention at one point in the pharmaceutical chain - the link between the
payer and the pharmaceutical manufacturer. The following list of proposed
interventions is by no means exhaustive but raises a broad range of alternative
policies lawmakers should consider in prescription drug reform.
Some recommended interventions would affect the interactions between
payers and pharmaceutical manufacturers. One popular political talking point is
allowing Medicare to negotiate prices for prescription drugs like it does for other
healthcare goods and services.226 However, the Congressional Budget Office has
found that Medicare negotiation would have "a negligible effect on federal
spending' 227 because each individual Medicare Part D already negotiates with
pharmaceutical companies and because Medicare has limited ability, and thus
228
decreased bargaining power, to exclude prescription drugs from coverage.
Without the ability to not cover from certain drugs, Medicare Part D plans often
must accept high prescription drug prices from companies.229 Additionally,
Medicare negotiation could have a negative impact on the negotiating power of
other federal government programs, particularly the 340B Drug Discount Program
and the VA.23° While the federal government could theoretically expand its
mandatory discounts to Medicare, this could still threaten the negotiating power of
other federal government programs and could incentivize prescription drug
manufacturers to increase prices to make up for lost revenue.
Other proposals focus on accessibility and affordability specifically from the
patient perspective. Patients generally make copayments when they receive a
prescription drug. Scholars have suggested basing beneficiaries' copayments on
the effective price of a prescription drug after rebates instead of the on the list
226. Kesselheim et al., supra note 12, at 865.
227. Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Searching for Savings in Medicare Drug Price
Negotiations, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-
brief/searching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug-price-negotiations/; Congressional Budget Office,
Letter to Senator Ron Wyden (April 10, 2007), available at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/79xx/doc7992/ drugpricenegotiation.pdf.
228. See Sachs, supra note 69, at 2326.
229. See id.
230. See Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 90, at w834.
39
Knox: More Prices, More Problems: Challenging Indication-Specific Prici
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
23123price or reducing copayments by payers or through subsidies.232 While these
approaches may make prescription drugs more affordable at the time of purchase,
decreasing patients' out-of-pocket spending, patients' premiums would potentially
increase and effect a rise in overall federal government spending on prescription
drugs.233 Consideration of the magnitude of the potential premium increases and
federal government spending increase would have to be made in comparison to
increased accessibility to patients at point-of-service.
Broader reforms of the pharmaceutical patent and antitrust regimes may have
the most promise in decreasing prescription drug spending and prices. Patent
exclusivity keeps the price of prescription drugs high and prevents competitors
from entering into the market. Proposals have been made to limit the exclusivity
period of patents, particularly limiting "secondary patents for trivial changes of a
patented molecule," as well as prohibiting anti-competitive practices, including
pay-for-delay agreements where patent holders pay generic companies to delay
their entry into the market.234 Some scholars have even recommended using
executive authority to mandate compulsory licensure of prescription drugs based
on government-funded research, though this would not be a system-wide
solution.235 Especially with the amount of research that is partially funded by the
federal government,236 there is a social expectation that prescription drugs will be
made reasonably accessible and affordable to the public.237
231. See Rachel Sachs, Drug Policy: The Year In Review, And The Year Ahead, HEALTH AFF.
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180103.276023/fu11/.
232. Darius N. Lakdawalla et al., U.S. Pharmaceutical Policy in A Global Marketplace, HEALTH
AFF. w138, w138 (2008).
233. See Sachs, supra note 231 ("As scholars have noted, patients' out-of-pocket costs may be
based on their drugs' list prices, even if a Part D sponsor has negotiated a lower price. CMS has
proposed passing some of those rebates on to patients; this would decrease many beneficiaries' point-
of-sale costs significantly, but would potentially increase beneficiary premiums-and increase CMS'
direct subsidy costs- overall.).
234. Kesselheim et al., supra note 12, at 864.
235. See generally Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing:
Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 275 (2016); Rachel Sachs,




236. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 12, at 863 ("important innovation that leads to new drug
products is often performed in academic institutions and supported by investment from public sources
such as the National Institutes of Health. A recent analysis of the most transformative drugs of the
last 25 years found that more than half of the 26 products or product classes identified had their
origins in publicly funded research in such nonprofit centers.").
237. David Gilman & Nathan Dowden, Is Value-Based Drug Pricing Compatible with Pharma
Innovation?, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://catalyst.nejm.org/is-value-based-
drug-pricing-compatible-with-pharma-irmovation/ ("This innovation has occurred within the context
of an implicit social contract. The U.S. government substantially subsidizes basic research and the
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Critics have argued that decreasing the exclusivity periods on patents would
stifle innovation, removing a key financial incentive for pharmaceutical companies
to develop new prescription drugs. Studies have challenged this assertion,
demonstrating that the revenue gained in the exclusivity period far exceed the costs
of pharmaceutical research and development and decreasing the exclusivity period
would leave adequate incentives for drug companies.238 The Lancet Commission
on Essential Medicines recommended creating an Essential Medicines Patent Pool
which would essentially result in voluntary or compulsory licensure for all
essential medicines.239 These reforms may also challenge future innovation: while
pharmaceutical companies may have adequate economic incentives to continue
their work, removing some current incentives may result in companies pursuing
less risky, innovative research.
One final proposal is greater transparency in the comparative effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of prescription drugs. There is little transparency in the
actual prices paid for prescription drugs and there seems to be little intent on the
part of the pharmaceutical industry or the federal government to increase this
transparency.24° The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute was founded
to focus on cost-effectiveness research, but the Affordable Care Act "prohibited
the partially government-funded research institution from considering the relative
value of drugs and from using [quality-adjusted life years] as a cost-effectiveness
measure."241 The governments of several other countries fund assessments of
comparative clinical and economic value.242 Currently, only non-governmental
provision of health care, and it waives its ability to negotiate directly with manufacturers about prices.
In return, the biomedical industry is allowed to attempt to recoup its R&D investments during a
limited post- approval period defined by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (often called the Hatch-Waxman Act), with the expectation that drug prices will be set
at a point that ensures a reasonable level of population access.").
238. See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 235, at 328 (explaining that Gilead recouped recouped
its expenditure on Sovaldi and Harvoni in two and a half years, likely earning forty times the
development costs in that period).
239. Sabine Vogler, et al., How Can Pricing and Reimbursement Policies Improve Affordable
Access to Medicines? Lessons Learned from European Countries, 15 J. APPLIED HEALTH ECON. &
HEALTH POL'Y 307, 316 (2017).
240. HENRY WAXMAN ET AL., GETTING TO THE ROOT OF HIGH PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES:
DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 30-31 (July 2017)
241. See RALPH MARCELLO ET AL., DELOITTE HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: GET7ING TO VALUE: WHAT
POLICIES ARE ON THE TABLE TO MANAGE DRUG PRICES? 5 (2016). See also Kesselheim, supra note 16,
at 866 ("The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute had been expected to serve in this role.
It was hailed at its inception as a vehicle to promote robust comparative effectiveness research, but
Congress precluded it from considering drug costs as a central focus of its work, shifting instead to
patient engagement and decision aids. The institute's reauthorization in 2019 will provide another
opportunity to revisit its mission.").
242. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 12, at 866 ("In the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia,
Canada, and several other countries, government-funded technology assessment activities provide
support for comparative effectiveness studies and evaluate new products in light of comparative cost-
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organizations in the United States, including the Institute for Clinical and
Economic Review and others, conduct such assessments.243 Lawmakers should
repeal the law forbidding the government from using comparative effectiveness
research to determine the relative value of treatments and inform insurance
coverage and prescription drug pricing decisions.2" Advocating for further
transparency in prescription drug pricing and the comparative clinical and
economic effectiveness will encourage both rational prescription drug pricing and
more informed healthcare decision-making. This is true not only for patients
(knowing how much they will be paying for prescription drugs) and providers
(knowing how much the drugs they prescribed will cost the patient). Greater
transparency on comparative effectiveness drug prices, and in particular the
discounts on prescription drugs, can aid the government in negotiating prices and
improving access to patients.245
C. Moving Forward: Recommendations for Lawmakers
Ultimately, some combination of interventions is likely needed to truly control
prescription drug spending and make prescription drugs accessible and affordable
to all in the United States. High prescription drug prices and spending are complex
problems, and reforms at various points in the healthcare delivery system could be
effective. Moving forward, lawmakers should look to gain more insight on to how
these various pricing regimes and other interventions would affect prescription
drug spending and pricing in practice. Specifically, it is necessary to gain a better
understanding of the incentive effects of such models.
Both the federal and state government have begun experimenting with
alternative prescription drug pricing models. On the federal level, CMS can
experiment with different prescription drug payment models, as proposed to do
with Medicare Part B in 2015 and again in 2018.246 This plan includes a test of
indication-specific pricing of prescription drugs, outcomes-based pricing, and
effectiveness analysis. The information thus generated could be used by government and private
payers to help them respond to company-set prices, make determinations about formulary rules and
exclusions, and educate physicians and patients about the value of medication choices.").
243. Id. ("patients, physicians, and payers can turn to non- governmental organizations, such as
the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, The Medical Letter, the Independent Drug
Information Service, Oregon's Drug Effectiveness Review Project, and Consumer Reports Best Buy
Drugs, which provide information on value-based choices for select medications... . The data
generated by these groups can support lower drug prices by helping payers organize their formularies
and negotiate appropriate rebates, as well as guide prescribers and patients toward more appropriate
drug-use decisions.").
244. See MARCELLO ET AL., supra note 241, at 4.
245. Vogler, et al., supra note 239, at 315.
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reducing or eliminating patient cost-sharing.247 CMS should continue to explore
interventions and implement an experiment on prescription drug pricing in its
programs. The resulting data would be particularly valuable to lawmakers moving
forward with reforms.
On the state level, some states are experimenting with value-based pricing
models in their government health insurance programs. Massachusetts ought a
waiver under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act to experiment with the
prescription drug part of its Medicaid program.248 Its model would result in a
closed formulary with at least one prescription drug covered in each therapeutic
area.249 The proposal also included a component focusing on value: it would
exclude drugs with "limited or inadequate benefit until incremental clinical value
is proven.,250 This waiver could have resulted in Massachusetts choosing not to
cover several types of prescription drugs, such as those prescription drugs
approved through FDA's Accelerated Approval Pathway.251 Massachusetts
proposed that Medicaid beneficiaries could petition to access non-formulary
drugs.252 The federal government initially showed interest in this and similar
proposals, with President Trump's February 2018 budget proposing a study that
would allow five states to exclude FDA-approved prescription drugs from their
formularies, although it did not include continuing the mandatory rebates by
prescription drug manufacturers in these states.253 Even so, the Trump
Administration rejected the Massachusetts proposal, reiterating the requirement
that Medicaid programs cover all FDA-approved drugs.254 Such formularies have
received criticism from the public for restricting access to drugs, not taking patient
perspectives into account,255 using discriminatory value metrics, and devaluing the
247. See CMS proposes to test new Medicare Part B prescription drug models to improve
quality of care and deliver better value for Medicare beneficiaries, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-
releases/2016-Press-releases-items/2016-03-08.html.
248. See Kesselheim et al, supra note 16.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, supra note 118.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See Nicholas Bagley & Rachel E. Sachs, Limiting State Flexibility in Drug Pricing, 379
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1002, 1002-03 (2018); MaryBeth Musucemi et al., Section 1115 Medicaid
Demonstration Waivers: The Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section-1115-medicaid-
demonstration-waivers-the-current-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-
waivers/view/footnotes/#footnote-273141-22.
255. Jason Shafrin & Mark Linthicum, Patent-Centered Formularies: Steps In The Right
Direction, But Challenges Remain, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2Ol80404.5 10552/full/
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lives of people with disabilities. 256 Taking these perspectives of value into account
would be needed for states and the federal government to move forward with
formularies emphasizing value.
Other states have also explored pricing regulation at the state level without a
Section 1115 waiver. More than eighty pharmaceutical pricing bills were proposed
in 2017 in over thirty states.257 New York's bill, for example, passed in April 2017,
allows the state to put "limits on prescription drug costs based on their therapeutic
benefits.,25 8 Other states should follow and continue to experiment with various
interventions to reform prescription drug spending and pricing. This further
research and experimentation with various policy interventions will allow data
collection so future lawmakers can make informed choices.
Moving forward, lawmakers should continue to make evidence-based
proposals that will make prescription drugs more affordable and accessible to
patients while allowing for decreased overall prescription drug spending and
continued innovation incentives.
CONCLUSION
The skyrocketing prices of prescription drugs and increasing federal drug
spending pose significant threats to affordable healthcare in the United States. An
indication-specific pricing regime for prescription drugs in federal health
insurance programs would neither decrease overall prescription drug spending nor
improve accessibility and affordability of prescription drugs for individual
patients. The current legal and regulatory framework in Medicare, Medicaid, the
340B Drug Discount Program, and the Veterans Health Administration pose
several challenges to implementing any value-based pricing scheme, especially
indication-specific pricing. The FDA approval system and the risk of off-label
promotion liability also stand in the way of implementing an indication-specific
pricing regime in the United States. Additional policy effects and ethical
considerations would also have to be made in reforming the prescription drug
pricing system in order to protect patients' access to medicines. The barriers to
indication-specific pricing may not be insurmountable, but substantial system
modifications would have to be made for it to be a realistic option. Even with these
256. Ne'eman, supra note 217.
257. See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1. Particularly innovative bills were passed in
Maryland, New York, and Nevada. See id. See also Theodore T. Lee et al., Legal Challenges to State
Drug Pricing Laws, 319 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 865, 865-66 (2018) (discussing legal challenges to state
laws to control prescription drug prices); Fran Quigley, On Drug Pricing, States Step In Where
Washington Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/opinion/drug-
pricing-states.html (discussing state efforts on prescription drug price reform).
258. See Thomas J. Hwang et al., Value-Based Pricing and State Reform of Prescription Drug
Costs, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 609, 609 (2017).
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modifications, indication-specific pricing would likely not decrease prescription
drug prices or overall spending.
As the United States continues to pursue healthcare reform and tackles the
problem of unaffordable prescription drug prices, value-based pricing regimes
should not be disregarded. Other interventions should be considered to decrease
prescription drug prices and spending. Moving forward, lawmakers must explore
these potential solutions and focus on affordability and accessibility. The problem
of high prescription drug prices and spending is complex and multi-faceted, and
any change to the current regime will have impacts on the insurance system, patient
access, healthcare system spending, healthcare outcomes, and pharmaceutical
innovation.
Any reform to prescription drug pricing and spending must prioritize patient
access. Indication-specific pricing may create more problems while failing to
increase the accessibility and affordability of drugs. The current system of
prescription drug pricing is unethical and unaffordable. Reforms must not
perpetuate the problem.
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